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More than guns, bombs, or missiles, the Internet' is the most important
tactical tool for terrorist groups today.2 Just as millions of people use the
Internet each day to catch up on the news, check the local weather, or order
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The Internet is "an electronic communications network that connects computer net-
works and organizational computer facilities around the world." Merriam Webster's colle-
giate Dictionary 654 (11 th ed. 2003). The word Internet describes the network itself-"an
electronic communications network that connects computer networks and organizational
computer facilities around the world. Id. The World Wide Web is "a part of the Intemet
accessed through a graphical user interface and containing documents often connected by
hyperlinks." Merriam Webster's collegiate Dictionary 1444 (11 th ed. 2003).
Terrorism is "[t]he use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause panic, especially as
a means of affecting political conduct." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1512-13 (8th ed. 2004).
An alternative definition of terrorism is:
[k]idnapping, murder, and other assaults against the life or physical integrity of those
persons to whom the state has the duty according to international law to give special
protection, as well as extortion in connection with those crimes. The use or threat of
violence to intimidate or cause panic especially as a means of affecting political con-
duct.
Organization of American States Convention on Terrorism, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949.
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a book online, the technological leaders of Al Qaeda in Iraq3 and its affili-
ated umbrella group, the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq, exploit the
Internet to announce to the world their latest attacks against American and
Iraqi civilians.4 Averaging between ten and twenty online statements every
day,5 Al Qaeda in Iraq uses the Internet to broadcast the planning and im-
plementation of suicide car bombings,6 announce strategic alliances with
3 Al Qaeda in Iraq is a loose network of autonomous terrorist cells and networks whose
figurehead is now Abu Ayyub al-Masri after the assassination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in
June 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,, I 1069-2227490,00.html. Ellen Knick-
meyer & Jonathan Finer, Insurgent Leader AI-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq, WASH. POST. (June 8,
2006); U.S. Publish Picture of New al-Qaeda Leader, TIMES ONLINE, June 15, 2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,11069-2227490,00.html. Since Zarqawi swore
allegiance to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in late 2004, references to an Al Qaeda in Iraq
group or network have become widespread by operatives and, in turn, by terrorism observ-
ers. Zarqawi was previously a senior leader of the Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah network.
See KENNETH KATZMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, AL QAEDA: PROFILE AND THREAT
ASSESSMENT (2005). Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Ansar al-Islam/Ansar al-Sunnah are
among the terrorist groups listed on the U.N. Security Council's 1267 Committee terrorist
sanctions list. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); see also THE NEW
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES BELONGING To OR ASSOCIATED WITH
THE TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA ORGANISATION As ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED By THE
1267 COMMrITEE, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/comnittees/1267/1267ListEng.htm.
[T]he U.N. Security Council Committee [which] ... oversees the implementation by
States of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council on individuals and entities be-
longing or related to the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden and the A1-Qaida organization and
maintains a list of individuals and entities for this purpose. In resolutions 1267 (1999),
1333 (2000), 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), the Security Council obliged all States to
freeze the assets, prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories, and pre-
vent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms and military equipment
with regard to the individuals/entities included on the list.
Id.
4 SITE Institute, The Mujahideen Shura Council Claims Responsibility for Several
Suicide Bombings, lED Detonations, and Sniping of American, Iraq, and Kurdish Forces
in al-Mosul, Baghdad, Heet, Beiji and al-Ramadi, Aug. 2, 2006, http://siteinstitute.org
(search "shura counsil"); SITE Institute, The Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq Issues a
Video of the Mutilated Corpses of the Two Captured American Soldiers in al-Yusefiya, July
10, 2006, http://siteinstitute.org (search "shura counsil video mutilated"). See also Muja-
hideen Shura Council in Iraq Web site, http://www.albayanat.blogspot.com (last visited
Oct. 30, 2006); see also Scott Shane, Zarqawi Built Global Jihadist Network on Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006. See generally JEAN CHARLES BRISARD, ZARQAWI: THE NEW FACE
OF AL-QAEDA (2005) (providing a ground-breaking look into the life and terrorist activities
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi).
5 Susan B. Glasser & Steve Coil, The Web as Weapon: Zarqawi Intertwines Acts on
Ground in Iraq with Propaganda Campaign on the Internet, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2005, at
Al [hereinafter Web as Weapon]; see also E-mail from Evan Kohlmann, International
Terrorism Consultant, to Benjamin R. Davis (Mar. 22, 2006) (on file with author)
(explaining that in 2006, Zarqawi and his associates have increased the number of
online statements from approximately ten per day to twenty).
6 See GLOBAL TERROR ALERT, AL-QAIDA'S DISTINGUISHED BATrLES OF MESOPOTAMIA
(ABu MusAB AL-ZARQAWI): THE BATTLE OF BADR AL-BAGHDAD (2005) [hereinafter BAT-
TLES OF MESOPOTAMIA], http://www.globalterroralert.com (translating a December 2005
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other terrorist groups, ' and shock the world with the beheadings of kid-
napped foreigners, such as American contractor Nicholas Berg.8
Unfortunately, Al Qaeda in Iraq is just one of many global and local ter-
rorist networks exploiting the Internet to conduct terrorist operations. For
example, the localized "home-grown" terrorist cell responsible for the July
7, 2005, suicide bomb attacks on the London tube and bus system that
killed fifty-two people, was "carried out by four men who had scoured
terror sites on the Internet" to obtain information on planning and carrying
out terrorist attacks. 9 The September 11, 2001 planners and hijackers also
exploited the Internet to achieve their goals. Senior Al Qaeda coordinators
involved in the September 11 th suicide hijacking plot, such as notorious Al
Qaeda training camp manager, Abu Zubaydah, exchanged thousands of
encrypted messages, posting their operational plans on a password-
protected section of a Web site.' ° According to U.S. officials who exam-
ined the contents of Zubaydah's computer following his capture, the flow
of e-mail messages regarding the attack began in May 2001 and continued
through September 9, 2001." However, "[tihe frequency of the messages
was highest in August 2001, the month immediately preceding the at-
tacks."12 According to other reports, Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the
September 11 th hijackers, transmitted a cryptic e-mail message to his co-
conspirators over the Internet confirming that the final plan was in place
just prior to the attacks.' 3 The extensive use of the Internet by the Septem-
ber 1 lth hijackers and planners of attacks elsewhere illustrates how the
Internet serves as a logistical tool for terrorist operatives.
Beneath the news headlines and TV images of bombings and beheadings
posted on sites and chat groups across the Internet, something even more
sinister and dangerous to the security of the United States and its allies is
video posted on an Islamic extremist Web site depicting the surveillance and planning
phase of a suicide bombing attack in Iraq, complete with footage of the attack and airing of
the attackers' "martyrdom" statements).
7 Web as Weapon, supra note 5; see also David Bamford, Zarqawi Shows Bin Laden
Loyalty, BBC, Oct. 18, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3752616.stm (an-
nouncing the alliance between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden).
8 War on Terror Digest, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP. May 11-13, 2004 (describing
the online posting of the video-taped beheading of American contractor Nicholas Berg on
the A1-Ansar bulletin board at www.al-ansar.biz).
9 Mark Townsend, Leak Reveals Official Story of London Bombings, LONDON OB-
SERVER, Apr. 9, 2006, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329453825-102285,00.html.
10 See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, JIHAD ONLINE: ISLAMIC TERRORISTS AND THE INTER-




13 Tom Zeller Jr., On The Open Internet, a Web of Dark Alleys, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20,
2004; GABRIEL WEIMANN, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WWW.TERROR.NET: How




taking place. Terrorist webmasters and militant extremists from dozens of
countries are exploiting the anonymous, inexpensive, and easily accessible
global reach of the Internet. Violent extremists are using the Internet to
recruit potential terrorist operatives, solicit funding for operations, train
current terrorists with the latest in bomb-making know-how, and plan op-
erations against civilian targets worldwide. 14 The success Al Qaeda and
affiliated movements have had in exploiting the Internet as an operational
center illustrates that "al Qaeda has become the first guerilla movement in
history to migrate from physical space to cyberspace. With laptops and
DVDs ... jihadists have sought to replicate the training, communication,
planning, and preaching facilities they lost in Afghanistan with countless
new locations on the Internet."' 5 As one Islamic extremist described in a
message he posted on the Al Qaeda-affiliated Global Islamic Media Front
Web site, "[t]he technology of the Internet facilitated everything. Today's
Web sites are the way for everybody in the whole world to listen to the
mujaheddin [sic].'
16
Today's mujahideen have launched a cyberjihad,17 signaling a new and
terrifying era in the war against Islamic-extremist terrorism. In this first
global conflict of the twenty-first century, religious extremists are
equipped with more than guns, bombs, and a populist message against the
infidel;18 terrorists are also armed with a technical and strategic mastery of
14 GABRIEL WEIMANN, TERROR ON THE INTERNET 123-29 (2006) [hereinafter TERROR ON
INTERNET] (providing a number of examples of online manuals that explain how to con-
struct explosive devices).
15 Steve Coil & Susan B. Glasser, Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations,
WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Terrorists Turn].
16 Web as Weapon, supra note 5, at Al. Mujahideen is a group or individual (mujahid)
that wages jihad or religious war. See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 814
(1 1th ed. 2003). Mujahideen are also known as Islamic guerilla fighters who wage battle in
conflict zones where they believe Muslim peoples are facing persecution or repression. See
id. See generally STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANI-
STAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 (2004) (provid-
ing a substantive description of the Arab-Afghan mujahideen in Afghanistan during the
1980s and the global spread of mujahideen to predominately Muslim conflict zones world-
wide during the 1990s).
17 Cyber jihad is a term coined to loosely describe Islamic extremist terrorists' use of
the Internet as a communications, fundraising, recruitment, training, and planning tool in
their battle against the enemy. Other authors who have referred to a cyber jihad in a similar
context include, U.S. Govt. Vulnerable to Cyber-Jihad, Security Summit Hears, WASH.
INTERNET DAILY (Mar. 21, 2006); Marc Lynch, Al-Qaeda's Media Strategies, 83 NAT'L
INT. 50 (2006). While not a complete list, some of the most commonly named enemies of
Islamic terrorist groups include the Unites States, Western European countries, secular Arab
governments, and Israel; see World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews
And Crusaders, Feb. 23, 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm
(naming the United States, Israel, Zionists, and Christian Crusaders as enemies of Islam).
18 An infidel is "an unbeliever with respect to a particular religion." MERRIAM WEB-
STER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 40 (11 th ed. 2003). The term is used derisively by many
Islamic extremists to condemn non-Muslims and Muslims who do not share extremists'
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the Internet. This knowledge enables terrorists to indoctrinate, recruit, and
train new members for attacks with little or no threat of discovery or cap-
ture. ' 9
Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are effectively using the Internet and
an estimated 4,500 terrorist-related Web sites 20 to advertise a global brand
of terror to millions of sympathetic Web users. According to Gabriel
Weimann, a professor at the University of Haifa in Israel who tracks more than
4,000 terrorist-related Web sites, "[t]he Internet is the network that connects
them all .... You can see the virtual community come alive.",2' The value
of the Internet to terrorist groups is now so significant that it makes no
difference whether terrorist leaders "are on a mountain in the Hindu Kush
or living with their beards shaved off in a suburb of Karachi .... They can
inspire and guide a worldwide movement without physically meeting their
followers-without knowing who they are.,
22
Despite growing evidence of the pervasive threat of online terrorist op-
erations, many U.S. policymakers continue to focus their Internet security
concerns on the threats posed by offensive cyber attacks on the country's
information technology infrastructure.23 As Internet security expert Bruce
militant beliefs. In an October 2001 video-taped speech, Osama bin Laden denounced all
Americans as infidels. See U.S. 'Infidels' are not safe: bin Laden, CBC NEWS, Oct. 8, 2001.
19 The rise of the cyber jihad was by no means unforeseen. As early as 1996, experts on
warfare and the Internet described terrorists' emerging use of the Internet as 'netwar' or
'cyberwar.' See JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, THE ADVENT OF NETWAR, 3-16, 19-
24, 81-82 (1996) (defining 'netwar' as a conflict of societal-level ideas waged on the Inter-
net via process of disrupting, damaging, or modifying what a population knows or thinks it
knows about itself and the world around it). The authors also defined the 'cyberwar' as the
"conducting of, and preparation for, military operations according to information-related
principles." Id.
20 Terrorists Turn, supra note 15, at Al; Jon Swartz, Terrorists' Use of Internet
Spreads, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2005, at 3B (reporting that the number of terrorist-affiliated
Web sites has increased from approximately a dozen in 1997 to an estimated 4,350 in
2005).
21 Terrorists Turn, supra note 15.
22 Paul Eedle, Terrorism.com, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 17, 2002.
23 See Jimmy Lee Shreeve, The New Breed of Cyber-Terrorist, THE INDEP., April 9,
2006. The article reports that Scott Borg, the director and chief economist of the U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security's Cyber Consequences Unit, argues that "attacks on com-
puter networks are poised to escalate to full-scale disasters that could bring down compa-
nies and kill people." Id. It is important to note that this Comment does not examine what
has traditionally been defined as offensive cyber-terrorism. Although the threat of a crip-
pling cyber attack on the nation's information technology infrastructure by a terrorist group
remains a national security priority for the United States and its allies, it is not the focus of
this Comment. This matter has previously been dealt with at length by a number of legal
scholars and policymakers. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Marc D. Goodman, In Defense of
Cyberterrorism: An Argument for Anticipating Cyber Attacks, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 1 (2002); Richard W. Walker, Gilmore Warns of Threat to Information Systems,
GOV'T COMP. NEWS, Mar. 27, 2002 (quoting James Gilmore, Chairman of the National
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism of Weapons of
Mass Destruction as saying that cyber attacks "are the most likely next [terrorist] attacks").
20061
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Schneier argues, "[t]he [cyberterrorism] hype is coming from the U.S.
Government and I don't know why.... If [terrorists] want to attack they
will do it with bombs like they always have.... Breaking pager networks
and stopping e-mail is not an act of terror."'24 Meanwhile, other national
security experts believe "that the threat of cyberplanning may be graver
than the threat of terrorist attacks on the world's [infrastructure] net-
works. '25 The concern is that that the virtual free rein terrorists currently
have over the Internet is allowing them to plan large-scale attacks against
civilian targets, while policymakers continue to worry primarily about a
cyber attack on the nation's information infrastructure. While a cyber at-
tack on America's information systems resulting in significant economic
losses or the deaths of Americans may or may not occur,26 there is substan-
tial evidence of a cancerous expansion of the cyber jihad, which can be
According to Georgetown University law professor, Dorothy E. Denning:
[c]yberterrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally under-
stood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and
the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its
people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberter-
rorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or property, or at least cause
enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions,
plane crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. Seri-
ous attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending
on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly
nuisance would not.
Cyberterrorism: Testimony Before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism Committee on
Armed Services, 105th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Dorothy E. Denning, Professor,
Georgetown University), available at
http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/-denning/infosec/cyberterror.html. Terrorist planning
activities that have been publicized suggest that a number of terrorist groups have indicated
an interest in carrying out a cyber attack on the information systems of American economic
and critical infrastructure hubs. For instance, a Web site operated by the Muslim Hackers
Club offers tutorials in spreading viruses, hacking stratagems, network 'phreaking;' and
links to secret sites which purport to disclose sensitive information like 'code names' and
radio frequencies used by the Secret Service. See Computer Lessons for Terrorists, NEWS-
WEEK, May 20, 2002, at 4 (Atlantic ed.) ("FBI and Defense Intelligence Agency ('DIA')
officials issued a warning that the Club included computer experts who had conducted
classes on how to mount terror attacks on computer networks.").
24 Mark Ward, Cyber Terrorism 'Overhyped,' BBC NEWS, March 14, 2003,
htt ://news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/technology/2850541 .stm.
Zeller, supra note 13, citing Timothy L. Thomas, Al Qaeda and the Threat of Cyber
Planning, PARAMETERS 11-20 (2003).
26 See Kevin Coleman, Cyber Terrorism, DIRECTIONS MAG., Oct. 10, 2003 (analyzing
the significant rise in the number of cyber security attacks on American business networks
and the resulting economic losses). But see Robert Lemos, What are the Real Risks of Cy-
berterrorism?, ZDNET, Aug. 26, 2002 (providing an in-depth examination of threats posed
to the United States' transportation and security systems, generally down-playing the threat,
and concluding that the greatest threat posed by cyber terrorism is to the Internet itself).
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directly linked to terrorist attacks that killed thousands of innocent civil-
ians.27
Limiting the ability of terrorist networks to use the Internet as an opera-
tional platform is one of the most significant challenges that lawmakers
and national security experts face.2" The problem could not be more central
to winning the war on terrorism. The growing devastation and technologi-
cal sophistication of terrorist attacks since September 11 th, 2001,29 require
that sovereign states and international organizations responsible for regu-
lating the Internet, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN"),30 eliminate, or at least diminish, opportunities
for terrorists to communicate, plan operations, and raise funds online.31
27 See Zeller, supra note 13.
28 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1347-1351 (2001). President
Bush stated in his speech to a Joint Session of Congress in the days immediately following
September 11 th that "[o]ur war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It
will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and de-
feated." Id.
29 See OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2004 1 (2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf (providing an annual evaluation of
terrorist attacks worldwide; the assessment includes the various types, locations, responsible
groups, and number of deaths and casualties resulting from terrorist acts).
30 ICANN is the principal organization responsible for the governance of the Internet.
ICANN "[ius an internationally organized, non-profit corporation that has responsibility for
Internet Protocol (IP) address space allocation, protocol identifier assignment, generic
(gTLD) and country code (ccTLD) Top-Level Domain name system management, and root
server system management functions." Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers, ICANN Information, http://icann.org/general/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). ICANN
shares administrative, research and development, and policy-making roles with a number of
other organizations. These entities include: (1) The Internet Engineering Task Force
("IETF'), http://www.ietf.org/overview.htmi (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) ("[IETF is]a large
open international community of network designers, operators, vendors and researchers
concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the smooth operation of the
Internet"); (2) the Domain Name Systems Security Extensions ("DNSSEC"),
http://www.dnssec.net/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) ("[An organization] designed to protect
the Internet from certain attacks, such as DNS cache poisoning. It is a set of extensions to
DNS, which provide: (a) origin authentication of DNS data, (b) data integrity, and (c) au-
thenticated denial of existence."); and (3) the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/overview/history.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). The
ITU is a United Nations specialized agency partially responsible for developing and coordi-
nating Internet-related global policies. Id.
31 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States emphasized
the importance of limiting the ability of terrorists and their associates to communicate,
travel and transfer funds across borders. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 2-12 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT]; 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, STAFF REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL 2
(2004) [hereinafter 9/11 STAFF REPORT ON TERRORIST TRAVEL].
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Despite recognizing that the Internet has become a primary weapon in
the arsenal of the enemy, the U.S. government and its international allies
have done a poor job of restricting terrorists' continued use of this power-
ful tool.32 Some policymakers and intelligence officials argue, however,
that terrorists' online activities provide a valuable trove of intelligence
regarding the ideological foundations and tactical operations of terrorist
movements.33 For example, Michael Vatis, former director of the National
Infrastructure Protection Center ("NIPC"), argues that the U.S. and its al-
lies exploit terrorist Web sites as a source of information useful in prevent-
ing attacks and shutting off key nodes of communication and fundraising.34
In the summer of 2006, British intelligence and law enforcement illustrated
the potential value of this surveillance strategy by using the Internet to
monitor the activities of a network of terrorist operatives planning to blow
up a number of U.S.-bound commercial airliners with liquid explosives.35
Through the monitoring of the operatives' Internet communications, au-
thorities discovered strategic details of the plan to blow the planes up in
mid-air and learned that the plot was reaching an operational phase when
the plotters began reviewing U.S.-bound airline schedules and ticket
prices.36
However, while monitoring the activities of known and suspected terror-
ist operatives will allow authorities to win a few online battles and disrupt
some terrorist plots, there are significant signs that governments and inter-
national organizations are losing the long-term war against the cyber jihad.
Proponents of this intelligence-gathering counterterrorism strategy fail to
acknowledge that the passive surveillance approach to combating the cyber
jihad in recent years has allowed terrorists to expand their presence online
32 See WEIMANN, supra note 13, at 14. Gabriel Weimann argues that the Internet is
difficult to regulate due, in part, to the borderless and decentralized nature of its design,
which make it an "ideal arena for activity by terrorist organizations." These systemic char-
acteristics include easy access, little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of govern-
ment control, potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world, anonymity of com-
munication, fast flow of information, inexpensive development and maintenance of a web
presence, a multimedia environment, and the ability to shape coverage in the traditional
mass media, which increasingly use the Internet as a source for stories. Id.
33 Bill Gertz, CIA Mines 'Rich' Content from Blogs, WASH. TIMES, April 19, 2006.
34 ONLINE NEWSHOUR: ONLINE TERRORISM, (PBS Internet broadcast, Aug. 2, 2005),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/july-dec05/online_8-02.html [hereinafter Vatis
interview]. The NIPC is a U.S. government interagency office responsible for detecting,
warning, and responding to cyber attacks.
35 Philip Webster, A Plan 'To Commit Unimaginable Mass Murder,' TIMES ONLINE,
Aug. 11, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-2308087,00.html; Bank of Eng-
land Names 19 Terror Suspects, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 2006.
36 Webster, supra note 35; Bank of England Names 19 Terror Suspects, supra note 35.
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and develop increasingly sophisticated web infrastructures for indoctrina-
tion, fundraising, recruitment, and the planning of terrorist operations.37
While the Internet's laissez faire legal environment has encouraged dra-
matic technological innovation and commercial growth in the last decade,38
the lack of effective U.S. or international cyber regulation or governance
mechanisms39 permits terrorist activity to operate in a relatively lawless
37 For one example of the challenges and limited utility of e-mail and telecommunica-
tions surveillance. See Barton Gellman et al., Surveillance Net Yields Few Suspects, WASH.
POST, Feb. 5, 2006 (describing how the Bush administration's previously secret warrantless
surveillance of approximately 5,000 American-based individuals' telephone and e-mail
communications has resulted in fewer than 10 individuals each year arousing enough suspi-
cion to have their domestic communications surveilled); see also Terrorists Turn, supra
note 15; Evan Kohlmann, The Real Online Terrorist Threat, 85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 5 (2006);
Swartz, supra note 20. Some experts argue that there is no distinction between online cyber
jihad activities and terrorists in the field. See Howard Altman, Web Warriors Track Down,
Close Jihadist Internet Sites, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 17, 2005. The article quotes Evan
Kohlmann as stating: "A lot of people [differentiate] between Internet terrorism and regular
terrorism. There is no difference. Anything they do, they do on the Internet, including re-
cruitment, training, financing, and propaganda." Id.; see also Yuki Noguchi & Sara Kehau-
lani Goo, Terrorists' Web Chatter Shows Concern About Internet Privacy, WASH. POST,
Apr. 13, 2006, at A14, (describing a noticeable increase in discussions in Islamic extremist
chat rooms regarding the need to observe enhanced online security procedures by using a
proxy software program that removes digital tracks and to avoid using the Google video
toolbar, which records keyword searches and the user's IP address).
38 Pub. F. Inst., Embracing Entrepreneurship and Am. Econ. Growth (Nat'l Comm'n on
Entrepreneurship White Paper
http://www.publicforuminstitute.org/nde/sources/reports/whitepap.pdf (describing the nexus
of innovation and entrepreneurship on the Internet which drives economic growth).
39 An entire body of legal scholarship has emerged in the last decade which identifies
and describes the characteristics of the Internet that make it a uniquely challenging institu-
tion to govern and regulate. In a particularly influential early analysis regarding the legal
dimensions of Internet regulation, David Johnson and David Post argue that attempts to
regulate the flow of electronic information across geographical boundaries are futile:
The notion that the effects of an activity taking place on that Web site radiate from a
physical location over a geographic map in concentric circles of decreasing intensity,
however sensible that may be in the non virtual world, is incoherent when applied to
Cyberspace. A Web site physically located in Brazil . .. has no more of an effect on
individuals in Brazil than does a Web site physically located in Belgium or Belize that
is accessible in Brazil. Usernet discussion groups, to take another example, consist of
continuously changing collections of messages that are routed from one network to
another, with no centralized location at all. They exist, in effect, everywhere, nowhere
in particular, and only on the Net.
See David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996) [hereinafter Johnson & Post]. Johnson and Post empha-
size that cyberspace can and should be conceived "as a distinct 'place' for purpose of legal
analysis by recognizing a legally significant border between Cyberspace and the 'real
world."' Id. at 1378. Johnson and Post conclude, however, that once rules governing behav-
ior on the Internet can be expected to eventually emerge naturally, as online users and ser-
vice providers bring order to anarchy and find meaningful ways to accomplish their ends
and govern themselves. Id. at 1387-91; see also David Post, Governing.Cyberspace, 43
WAYNEL. REV. 155, 166-67(1996).
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zone. Currently, most states and international organizations have estab-
lished very limited legal regimes to identify, investigate, and track terror-
ist-related Web sites.4 As former Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
Director George Tenet urges, now is the time for the international commu-
nity to implement a "wholesale taming of cyberspace.",4' Tenet told a confer-
ence at the end of 2004, "I know that these actions would be controversial in
this age where we still think the Internet is a free and open society with no
control or accountability. But, ultimately, the Wild West must give way to
governance and control. '' 2
In an effort to address the cyber jihad threat and tame the "Wild West" of
the Internet, this Comment provides a comprehensive examination of do-
mestic and international initiatives which address this situation. This
Comment demonstrates that existing domestic and international regulatory
regimes are insufficient to meet the growing threat that terrorists' use of
the Internet poses to U.S. and European security interests. In response to
these ineffective initiatives, this Comment proposes several new regulatory
measures to combat terrorists' exploitation of the Internet for planning and
operational purposes. Specifically, this Comment argues for a prevention
and enforcement-oriented international governance regime developed and
implemented by the ICANN and its stakeholders.43
This Comment includes eight parts. Part II of this Comment provides
background analysis regarding the technologies and techniques that terror-
ists use in pursuing their cyber jihad. Part H examines the rise of the cyber
jihad from the mid-1990s to the present, and the ways in which terrorists
use the Internet to further their lethal agenda. Part IV evaluates the U.S.
government's domestic responses to the cyber jihad threat since September
11 th through law enforcement and judicial actions. This section asserts that
the U.S. is failing to combat the cyber terror threat by implementing legis-
lation that incorrectly focuses on deterrence and voluntary compliance by
Internet providers. Part V analyzes the international community's re-
sponses to this challenge, noting that although some progress has been
made recently in combating online terror, efforts to date have been insuffi-
40 For a compilation of the substantive computer crime laws in 44 different coun-
tries see The Legal Framework-Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems, Moss
District Court, Norway, available at http://www.mosstingrett.no/info/legal.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Legal Framework-Unauthorized Access to Com-
puter Systems].
41 Zeller, supra note 13.
42 Id.
43 ICANN stakeholders are constituent members of ICANN committees and governing
bodies that maintain an active voice in Internet regulatory issues. Stakeholders include
sovereign governments, private companies, individual Internet users, non-governmental
organizations, and Internet policy experts. ICANN, Advisory Committees, Committees of
the Board of Directors, Task Forces, and Other Committees, http://icann.org/committees/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
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cient to seriously address the problem. Part VI presents five core principles
of governance that ICANN should apply in attempting to address the cyber
jihad problem. Part VII recommends several regulatory and enforcement
tools for ICANN to implement in order to eliminate, or greatly restrict, the
cyberjihadist threat. Part VIII concludes that ICANN and its major suppor-
tive stakeholders should implement an explicit timetable for Internet secu-
rity reform, as terrorists' ongoing exploitation of the Internet poses an in-
creasingly ominous national security threat to the United States and its
allies.
II. A TERRORIST'S PLAYGROUND: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
OF THE PROBLEM
One of the great ironies of the Internet era is that the very characteristics
of the Internet that appeal to government, industry, and private users are
some of the same dynamics that make it an ideal operational headquarters
for contemporary global terrorist movements." Cyber jihadists' masterful
manipulation of the Internet4 5 illustrates that Al Qaeda and affiliated or-
ganizations "have understood that both time and space have in many ways
been conquered by the Internet.
46
A. Gateways to the Cyber Jihad
Like any Internet user, a terrorist operative will find setting up a Web
site or e-mail account to be a very simple and inexpensive process. With
minimal disclosure requirements (which are difficult, if not impossible, for
providers to verify for accuracy), a cyber jihadist can set up any number of
free e-mail accounts within a matter of minutes.47
A cyber jihadist who wishes to set up a Web site must typically visit the
site of an Internet Service Provider4 8 ("ISP"), which, as the name suggests,
"provide[s] Internet access services to customers in exchange for a fee. ' 49
When registering with an ISP, the cyber jihadist faces little scrutiny regard-
44 See WEIMANN, supra note 13, at 3; Brenner & Goodman, supra note 23, at 5; ArN-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 10, at 3.
45 Web as Weapon, supra note 5, at Al.
46 id.
47 See Lawrence V. Molnar, Who Owns 'Invisible.com,' and 'Whols' Disappearing? A
Practitioner Looks for Answers, 48 REs GESTAE 26, 26-27 (2005) (comparing the ease with
which a person can set up a Web site or e-mail with acquiring a library card).
48 Worldwide, it is estimated that there are now more than 10,000 Internet Service Pro-
viders in operation, including dozens in states known to harbor or be sympathetic to terror-
ist elements. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2005), http://www.cia
.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
49 Brad Boline & Daniel A. Tysver, ISP Liability, BITLAW,
http://www.bitlaw.com/internet/isp.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
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ing the information provided. While technically illegal, it is exceedingly
easy for ISP registrants to provide false or misleading information on their
ISP registration form,5° which is then posted on the Whols registrar site.5
An examination of an ISP registrant profile on file with Whols illustrates
this point. Among the site registrants listed by a single U.S. ISP were pre-
sumably fictitious account holders such as "Bill Clinton," "God," and
"Mickey Mouse."52 ISPs in most countries operate under very limited
guidelines for regulation and oversight, and face limited fiduciary duties to
verify account information or monitor content posted on a site.53
ICANN has minimal accreditation disclosure requirements for users who
wish to establish a domain name. 54 These regulations are to be imple-
mented and enforced by the ISP on the individual user level.55 However,
ISPs have little incentive to enforce those requirements. In fact, because of
poor enforcement efforts by individual governments and ICANN, "most
registrars do not conduct any background checks, nor assume any respon-
sibility or liability due to a customer's registration containing false or im-
proper contact information. 56 As a result of these lax policies, "individuals
or entities with misguided, improper or outright illegal motives can own a
domain name and enjoy worldwide attention while hiding behind improper
or false identities. 57
Each Web site or e-mail account holder exhibits a unique identifier ad-
dress called an Internet Protocol ("IP") address 58 which address attaches to
all electronic communication sent over the Internet from a particular com-
puter.59 One purpose of the IP address and ISP registration information is
to identify Web users and providers, and to assist investigative authorities
50 Molnar, supra note 47.
51 See Whols.com, http://whois.com/nonssl/cus faq.htm (last visited Oct 30, 2006). The
'Whols' Web site provides provides a search function for users to find domain name regis-
tration information by domain names and IP addresses. Id.
52 See Accuracy and Integrity of the Whols Database: Hearing Before the Subcom. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 15 (2002).





58 Each computer on the Internet has a unique address called its Internet Protocol (IP)
address that permits each individual computer user to send and receive messages and visit
Web sites. See ICANN Information, http://icann.org/general/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
59 Id. The legitimacy of the LP system is challenged by new services which effectively
hide a user's IP address. For example, some Internet Service Providers are now offering
Internet users and owners of Web sites the opportunity to establish "dynamic IPs" that do
not have fixed Internet Protocol addresses. See, e.g., No-IP Free-Free Dynamic DNS,
http://www.noip.comlservices/managed-dns/free-dynamic-dns.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2006) (offering Internet user free no IP URLs.).
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in tracing the origins or user identity of a particular message or Web site.
6
0
In reality, however, the lack of substantial and reliable ISP and IP identifier
information typically leaves investigators with few leads or tips with which
to begin an investigation. 61 Further complicating investigator's efforts are
cyber jihadists' practice of frequently alternating the location of their
Internet usage.62 This cat-and-mouse activity often greatly limits the value
of tracking down the location of a particular IP address.63
Even when authorities are successful in closing down an extremist Web
site or capturing a cyber jihadist responsible for disseminating operational
material, their associates are easily able to reconstitute the site or e-mail
addresses at another ISP or e-mail provider by once again providing false
registrant information.'
B. A Global Game of Cat and Mouse
Despite an ever-growing number of Islamic extremist Web sites used to
incite or plan violent attacks, the efforts of the United States and other
governments around the world have proven to be ineffective at disrupting
terrorist-affiliated sites and preventing cyber jihadists' initial access to the
Internet.65 Cyber jihadists build strength online in numbers, redundancy,
60 Hans Klein, ICANN and Internet Governance: Leveraging Technical Coordination to
Realize Global Public Policy, 18 THE INFO. SOC'Y 193, 195 (2002).
61 See Internet Domain Name Fraud-The U.S. Government's Role in Ensuring Public
Access to Accurate WhoIs Information: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2003)
[hereinafter Internet Domain Name Fraud Hearing] (examining the complications which
false and deceptive ISP registration information pose to investigators).
62 See Marketing of Terrorism Through the Internet, Intelligence and Terrorism Infor-
mation Center at the Center for Special Studies (2004),
www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1 2_04/int-m.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
ITIC Marketing of Terrorism Study] (providing a troubling study of how terrorists exploit
anonymity and lack of regulation on the Internet and describing how the terrorist group
Hamas was able to re-launch its main Web site from a Malaysia-based provider within days
after its U.S.-hosted site was shut down). According to the organization's Web site,
The Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center ("ITIC") "is part of the Center
for Special Studies (CSS), an NGO [non-governmental organization] dedicated to
the memory of the fallen of the Israeli Intelligence Community and it is located
near Gelilot, north of Tel Aviv. It is headed by (Col. Ret.) Dr. Reuven Erlich." It
focuses its investigative efforts on the activities of Hamas and Hizballah, terrorist
financing, as well as "anti Israeli incitement and hate propaganda." See ITIC,
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/engsite/contentT 1/.asp?Sid=18&pid= 121 (last
visited Oct. 18, 2006).
63 Molnar, supra note 47, at 26-30.
64 See Internet Domain Name Fraud Hearing, supra note 61.
65 WEIMANN, supra note 13, at 15 (describing the dramatic growth of terrorist groups
that exploit the Internet for tactical gain) Weimann's research concluded that there are
currently more than 4,300 terrorist related Web sites. Id.
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and decentralization of their communications, thereby limiting the impact
of enforcement actions against a Web site or email account.66 The global
Web site infrastructure of the designated Palestinian terrorist group
Hamas67 illustrates this point. A 2004 study by the Israel-based Intelligence
and Terrorism Information Center ("ITIC") found that Hamas utilizes
twenty active Web sites in seven languages that are hosted by ISPs in Rus-
66 Id.
67 In October 1997, the United States Department of State designated Hamas (a.k.a. the
Islamic Resistance Movement) as a Foreign Terrorist Group, pursuant to the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996. Fact Sheet: Secretary of State designates Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/l0/frIO050l.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2006). The Im-
migration and Nationality Act defines terrorist activity to mean:
[a]ny activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or
which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the
United States or any State) and which involves any of the following: (I) The high jack-
ing or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). (H) The
seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another indi-
vidual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do
or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the
individual seized or detained. (III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected
person (as defined in section 111 6(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or upon the
liberty of such a person. (IV) An assassination. (V) The use of any-(a) biological
agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b) explosive or firearm (other
than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly,
the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. (VI)
A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. (iii) The term "engage in
terrorist activity" means to commit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an or-
ganization, an act of terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably
should know, affords material support to any individual, organization, or government
in conducting a terrorist activity at any time, including any of the following acts: (I)
The preparation or planning of a terrorist activity; (II) The gathering of information on
potential targets for terrorist activity; (III) The providing of any type of material sup-
port, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, false documenta-
tion or identification, weapons, explosives, or training, to any individual the actor
knows or has reason to believe has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or for any ter-
rorist organization; (V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist
organization, terrorist government, or to engage in a terrorist activity.
Id.
The United States Department of Treasury describes Hamas as a terrorist organization
[t]hat has intentionally killed hundreds of innocent civilians and continues to kill and
maim with the aim of terrorizing a civilian population. Hamas was formed in 1987 as
an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas activists
have conducted many attacks-including large-scale suicide bombings-against Is-
raeli citizens and military targets. In the early 1990s, they also targeted U.S. citizens,
suspected Palestinian collaborators and Fatah rivals.
See Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding
Hamas and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities (Aug. 22, 2003) [hereinafter
U.S. Charities Funding Hamas], available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js672.htm.
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sia, Ukraine, Malaysia, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.68 The most strategically significant
Hamas sites were hosted by ISPs in East Asia, where Hamas may perceive
that government monitoring of Internet content and activities is least ag-
gressive.69 The official Web site of Hamas' terrorist-operational wing, the
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, 70 responsible for dozens of suicide attacks
on Israeli targets, 7' is hosted by an ISP in Malaysia.72 The main Internet
headquarters of Hamas, has three Web addresses with separate LP ad-
dresses and ISPs located in countries less vulnerable to American pres-
sure.
73
The ITIC concluded that the global decentralization of the Hamas Web
infrastructure "is an indication, in our assessment, of a deliberate policy of
the Hamas movement to avoid storing their first and second priority Web
sites on American Internet service providers. 74 The ITIC emphasized that
Hamas' strategy illustrates the group's "cautiousness and the movement's
desire to preserve the flexibility and survivability of its Internet infrastruc-
ture over a prolonged period of time. 75
Many terrorist groups maintain Web sites on multiple Internet servers to
ensure that a site taken down on one server can be re-launched from an-
other server within hours, most likely in a different country. A Chechen
militant group site, Kavkaz Center, includes a section on its front page
68 ITIC Marketing of Terrorism Study, supra note 62.
69 Id.
70 Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic Resistance Movement,
http://www.alqassam.info (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
71 The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades "employ a variety of tactics, including kidnap-
ping, assassinating Israeli soldiers, attacking Israeli civilians and ambushing Israeli vehi-
cles. The group's military activities during the second Intifada have been characterized by
the use of suicide bombings against targets such as buses, restaurants, coffee shops, hotels
and other civilian locations in Israel." Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor Intelligence
Review, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades,
http://www.janes.com/security/international-security (follow news) (last visited Aug. 22,
2006).
72 ITIC Marketing of Terrorism Study, supra note 62.
73 See Hamas Web sites: The Palestinian Information Center, http://www.palestine-
info.info (last visited Aug. 26, 2006) (registered in Dubai, United Arab Emirates); The
Palestinian Information Center, http://www.palestine-info.net (last visited Aug. 26, 2006)
(registered in Malaysia); and The Palestinian Information Center, http://www.palestine-
info.com (last visited Aug. 26, 2006) (registered in Beirut, Lebanon).
74 ITIC Marketing of Terrorism Study, supra note 62. It is important to note, however,
that other terrorist networks appear to be less cautious about the locations they select for the
posting of their Internet sites. For instance, the cyber jihad watch-dog group, Internet Haga-
nah, estimates in a January 2005 study on the Internet infrastructure of the U.S. designated
Hezbollah terrorist group, that the terrorist network maintains at least 25 websites world-
wide. Of these sites, twenty-two are hosted by ISPs in Iran, while 22 are hosted by compa-





noting the location of the site's six operating servers, providing visitors
with the option of visiting any of the six mirror sites if the main site is in-
capacitated by Russian government security services.76
Other cyber jihadists utilize their computer skills to hack into the servers
of companies and other organizations, and use those servers, unbeknownst
to the provider, as de facto ISPs or proxy servers.77 This tactic allows cyber
jihadists to post their sites and deliver their communications while obscur-
ing their own IP address.78 For example, a publication by Mustapha Set-
marian Nasar, a major Al Qaeda propagandist, was first released via a
hacked American Web site, http:///www.carriagehouseglass.com, where it
was secretly hidden in a file directory.79 In addition, "[t]his same hacked
Web site also published over 700 megabytes of video lessons given by
Nasar and numerous other documents written by him." 80 Another cyber
jihadist, known by the pseudonym Irhaby 007,81 "hacked his way into an
unprotected file directory on an Arkansas state government Web site, and
used it to host beheading videos and other propaganda" for Al Qaeda in
Iraq. 2
Other cyber jihad Web sites rely on the knowledge that ISPs worldwide are
not required to monitor content or to control access to sites on their servers
until they are made aware of egregious contents on a particular site. 83 For ex-
ample, the posting of the Nicholas Berg beheading video on the Internet be-
came world news almost instantly, Acme Commerce, the Malaysia-based Web
host for the AI-Ansar Al-Islam terrorist group's site, acknowledged that it was
76 See Chechen Separatist Basayev's Web site Back Online in Finland After Lithuania
Shutdown, MOSNEWS.COM, Oct. 11, 2004,
http://mosnews.com/news/2004/l 0/11 /websitereopen.shtml. The addresses of these mir-
rored sites include: kavkaz.tv; kavkaz.uk.com; kavkaz.org.uk; kavkazcenter.com; kavkaz-
center.net; kavkazcenter.info (last visited Oct. 30, 2006). If one of these Kavkaz Center
Web sites were taken down, viewers could also visit a web archive site such as
http://www.webarchive.org in order to obtain the addresses of the mirrored sites.
77 See Evan Kohlmann, Al Qaeda and the Internet: Online Discussion, WASH. POST,
Aug. 8, 2005, [hereinafter Kohlmann Online Discussion]; Joseph Farah, Islamist Terror
Still Promoted on Web, WORLD NET DAILY, Nov. 29, 2001,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=25485 (last visited Aug. 24,
2006) (describing how the Al Qaeda affiliated Azzam.com Web site established mirrored
sites in different countries to enable the site to quickly relaunch when a country shuts down
one version of the site.).
78 Kohlmann Online Discussion, supra note 77.
79 Id.; Michael Levenson, Crafts Website Hacked by Terrorists, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7,
2006.
80 Kohlmann Online Discussion, supra note 77.
81 The actual identity of Irhaby 007 is believed to be Younis Tsouli, who was detained
in the United Kingdom in the fall of 2005. Rita Katz & Michael Kern, Terrorist 007, Ex-
posed, WASH POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at B 1.
82 Kohlmann Online Discussion, supra note 77.
83 Molnar, supra note 47, at 26-30.
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not aware of the existence of the site containing until "huge numbers of people
trying to view the video overloaded its systems" and crashed its server.84
Many ISPs in the U.S. are notorious for providing hosting services to terror-
ist groups. In November 2005, the Tampa Tribune reported that a U.S.-based
ISP, HostDime.com, was hosting two Web sites, shikaki.net and rabdullah.net,
controlled by the designated terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad.85 When
the HostDime.com manager was notified by the newspaper and agreed to take
down the terrorist sites, he expressed the sentiment of many ISPs which host
violent and terrorist-related content on their servers: "[w]e screen accounts as
best we can.... If we sell hosting space to someone who is hosting something
illegal, we don't know about it until somebody brings it to our attention. ' 6 In
late August 2006, the Internet Haganah87 Web site posted a detailed instruction
manual first discovered on the prominent Islamic extremist site,
http://www.alhesbah.org/v/, 88 entitled a "Plan of Action for the Jihad Fighter:
84 Jonathan Kent, Berg Video Website Shut Down, BBC, May 13, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3710709.stm.
5 Altman, supra note 37. In October 1997, the United States Department of State
named Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) a Foreign Terrorist Group, pursuant to the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, Fact Sheet: Secretary of State Designates Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra
note 67. PIJ was subsequently listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity by the
U.S. Department of Treasury. Press Release, Treasury Designates Charity Funneling Money
to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, U.S. Department of Treasury (May 4, 2005), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2426.htm.
6 Altman, supra note 37.
87 For an extensive database of current and recently taken down jihadist Web sites, visit
Internet Haganah, http://haganah.org.il/haganahlindex.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).
According to the organization's Web site, Internet Haganah "is a global open-source intelli-
gence network dedicated to confronting Internet use by Islamist terrorist organizations, their
supporters, enablers and apologists. Internet Haganah is also a grass-roots activist organiza-
tion which encourages businesses to not provide services to Islamic extremists." Internet
Haganah, http://haganah.org.i/harchives/003218.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006). De-
scribed by some observers as "Internet vigilantes," Internet Haganah utilizes a
number of provocative and somewhat controversial tactics to confront terrorists on
the Internet. See Brad Stone, Heros or Mettlesome Hacks, Business
EdgeNewsweek-MSNBC.com, July 13, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.comid/8560624/site/newsweek/. Haganah's activities
include hacking sites identified as terrorist-associated cyber environments and
mocking extremist Internet postings regarding Internet Haganah's exposure ef-
forts. Other terrorism consultants, such as the SITE Institute's Rita Katz, have
critiqued Haganah's efforts to shut down extremist sites as counterproductive, as
terrorists predictably change tactics in the face of interdiction. See Nadya Labi, Jihad
2.0, THE ATLANTIC, July 1, 2006.
88 As of August 30, 2006, Al Hesbah registered 8,219,475 unique visits to its site,
http://www.al-hesbah.org/v/. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Annals of Terrorism: Private
Jihad, THE NEW YORKER, May 29, 2005, (describing how Al Hesbah has become an impor-
tant extremist Web site for postings and chat rooms after the web master of another site,
Ansar, was arrested for playing a role in a terrorist plot).
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How to Kill a Westerner in the Arabian Peninsula. '89 The Al Hesbah site is
hosted by Wild West Domains, Inc., a Scottsdale, Arizona-based ISP 90 and its
network access provider is Dallas, Texas-based Colo4Dallas, Inc.91
Ultimately, the effect of inaction in the face of a growing cyber jihadist
threat is startling. The inability of national security officials, Internet regu-
lators, and providers to require and enforce accurate disclosure of Internet
registration information has enabled an entire generation of cyber jihadists
to exploit the Internet for murderous gains.
C. Techniques and Tactics of Cyber Jihadists
Cyber jihadists exploit the Internet through a variety of free and widely
available technologies and easily applied techniques that are exceedingly
difficult for authorities to restrict. Among the tactics terrorists employ are:
encrypted and coded e-mail; steganographic messages; e-groups and chat
rooms; e-mail dead-drops; openly accessible and password protected Web
sites; hydra web links; and span mimicking.
1. Encrypted Messages & Files
As law enforcement and security services' interception of terrorists' mes-
sages in some countries has grown,92 operatives have increasingly utilized
encryption technologies to communicate online via e-mail.93 As the Wash-
ington Post reported, "Al Qaeda members have taught individuals ... how
to use the Internet to send messages and how to encrypt those communica-
tions to avoid detection."'94 For example, Wadih El-Hage, Osama bin
Laden's former personal secretary and a senior planner of the 1998 Al
Qaeda bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, "sent en-
89 Internet Haganah, Islamist Al-hesbah Website Plan of Action for the Jihad Fighter:
How to kill a Westerner in the Arabian Peninsula, Aug. 26, 2006,
http://www.haganah.org.il/harchives/005709.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
0 Wild West Domains,
https://www.wildwestdomains.com/gdshop/about.asp?se=%2B&prog%5Fid=wildwestdoma
ins&ci=3299&nocos=l (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
91 Colo4Dallas, http://www.colo4dallas.com/default (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
92 Patrick Jonsson, New Profile of Home Grown Terrorist Emerges, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, June 26, 2006, at 1 (describing the FBI's uncovering of a Miami-based group of
extremists involved in terrorist planning activities over the Internet).
93 To "encrypt" is "[t]o scramble data to prevent unauthorized access." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 281 (3d ed. 1994). Encryption involves complex algorithms-a
procedure or formula for solving a problem. Breaking into encrypted information requires
sophisticated computer skills and mathematics.
94 Douglas Farah & Peter Finn, Terrorism, Inc.; Al Qaeda Franchises Brand of Vio-
lence to Groups Across World, WASH POST, Nov. 21, 2003, at A33.
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crypted e-mails under various names to associates in Al Qaeda. ' '95 In addi-
tion, "Khalik Deek, an alleged terrorist arrested in Pakistan in 1999, used
encrypted computer files to plot bombings in Jordan at the turn of the mil-
lennium. ' '9 6 The convicted planner of the 1993 World Trade Center bomb-
ing, Ramzi Yousef, "used encrypted files to hide details of a plot to destroy
eleven U.S. airliners over the Pacific Ocean. 97
2. Codes & Steganography
Terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, use online coding techniques or
programs, known as steganography,98 which allow illicit computer users, to
hide a message inside another message, image, or file posted on the Inter-
net.99 For example, French intelligence officials assert that "suspects ar-
rested in an alleged plot to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Paris were to get
the go-ahead for the attack via a message hidden in a picture posted on the
Intemet."' ° Other extremists utilize "Internet bulletin boards carrying por-
nographic and sports information" to relay steganographic operational in-
formation to associates located elsewhere in the world.'0'
According to Internet security expert Chet Hosmer, other terrorist opera-
tives transfer messages via "images that might be in an email message...
[inside an] image that no one else would be able to detect or see."'1 2 Sep-
tember I Ith ringleader, Mohamed Atta, may have used steganographic
tactics to encode e-mail messages to his co-conspirators. Atta was "seen
95 STEPHANIE R. BETANCOURT, SANS INSTITUTE, STENOGRAPHY: A NEW AGE OF TERROR-
ISM 2 (2004) [hereinafter BETANCOURT/SANS INSTrrUTE].
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 NEWTON'S TELECOM DIcIoNARY 859 (22d ed. 2006). Steganography is defined as "a
method of hiding one piece of information within another." Id.
99 BETANCOURT/SANS INSTITUTE, supra note 95. According to the SANS Institute,
"there are currently over 140 steganography programs available" for public purchase. Id. at
3. The steganography tools ("S-Tools") "range from software that hides data in images to
software that hides data in spam." Id. The SANS Institute notes that, "[s]teganography tools
for Microsoft Windows include several programs that process GIF images, BMP images,
and audio WAV files." Id. Steganography tools also include "a variety of encryption capa-
bilities including IDEA, MDC, DES, and Triple DES." Id. According to Andy Brown, the
creator of S-Tools, a company that produces a popular steganography software program that
"works by spreading the bit-pattern of the message file to be hidden across the least-
significant bits of the color levels in the image. S-Tools tries to reduce the number of image
colors in a manner that preserves as much of the image detail as possible." Id.
100 Brian Ross, A Secret Language Hijackers May Have Used Secret Internet Messaging
Technique, ABC NEWS, Oct. 4, 2001.
1o1 See Sue Pleming, Muslim Extremists Utilize Web Encryption, REUTERS, Feb. 6, 2001;
see generally Bruce Schneier, Bruce Schneier On Crypto, the FBI, Privacy and More, THE
REGISTER, Oct. 3, 2001,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/03/bruce-schneier-on-crypto/.
102 Ross, supra note 100.
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repeatedly by witnesses using his Hotmail account at public libraries in
Florida to surf the Internet, downloading what appeared to be pictures of
children and scenes of the Middle East."'
10 3
Even where a terrorist's e-mail is not encrypted, terrorist operatives are
known to utilize previously identified code words to signal that a particular
event or action is going to take place. In the weeks preceding the Septem-
ber 11 th attacks, September 11 th ringleader Mohammed Atta e-mailed his
Al Qaeda associates: "The semester begins in three more weeks. We've
obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of
urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering."'"
3. E-Groups
An e-group is a service offered by an ISP for users with common inter-
ests to exchange messages. 1°5 The original ISP or registrar of the group
determines whether the group is open to all users or is password-
protected.' °6 Terrorist operatives and their sympathizers have exploited
Web and e-mail providers, such as Yahoo, to create a virtual cyber com-
munications center for carrying out terrorist-related activities.' 7 For in-
stance, at the Yahoo chat groups "Jehaad" and "The Jihad Group," "one
can view sickening media presentations posted by Al Qaeda zealots. Vid-
eos of Russian soldiers being tortured by Chechen mujahedeen, mujahe-
deen vehicle bombing operations, sermons by jihadist sheikhs, [and] hom-
ages to bin Laden ... "108 Other operatives visit these Web sites to leave
coded or steganographic messages for their associates to review.'°9
4. E-mail Dead Drops
E-mail dead drops are another simple but effective tactic used by terrorist
conspirators. E-mail dead drops involve the distribution of a user name and
password for an e-mail account to members of a terrorist cell who can then
103 Id.
104 WEIMANN, supra note 13, at 10 (explaining that the references to the various faculties
was apparently the code for the buildings targeted in the attacks and the 19 confirmations
clearly relates to the 19 hijackers who carried out the suicide hijacking attacks on Septem-
ber 1 th).
105 See Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist
Use of the Internet, 5 COL. ScI. & TECH. L. REv. 5, 40 n. 148 (2004).
6 Id. Hotmail provides free email accounts. See Microsoft Online Services,
http://join.msn.comhotmail/overview-std (last visited Oct. 30, 2000).
107 Rita Katz & Josh Devon, WWW.JIHAD.COM: E-Groups Abused by Jihadists, NAT'L
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enter the account and save an unsent message in the draft folder for the
other account users." ° Because the message is never sent from the account,
there is no identifying information to assist law enforcement officials in
tracing the IP address or location of the message creator.1 '
Khalid Sheik Mohammed, a key planner of the September 11 th attacks
arrested in Pakistan in March 2003,'12 "used the e-mail dead drop tech-
nique to avoid having his e-mails intercepted by eavesdroppers in the
United States or allied governments." ' 3 Mohammed or his operatives
would open an account on a free, public e-mail service such as Hotmail, write a mes-
sage in draft form, save it as a draft, then transmit the e-mail account name and pass-
word during chatter on a relatively secure message board .... The intended recipient
could then open the e-mail account and read the draft .... 114
Because no e-mail message was sent, there was a reduced risk of intercep-
tion by authorities.
5. Secure Web Sites
Terrorist operatives have exploited the electronic mail services provided
by extremist Web sites in order to communicate with members of their
terrorist network. Todd M. Hinnen, a senior George W. Bush administra-
tion counter-terrorism official, describes a scenario in which a cyber ji-
hadist could use a secure site to communicate with his associates: "Imagine
a secure Web site[:] www.jihad.com. The Web site supports basic e-mail
services. An e-mail can be sent from one of its e-mail accounts (e.g.,
johndoe@jihad.com) to another (e.g., janedoe@jihad.com) without ever
leaving jihad.com's servers. It cannot, therefore, be intercepted or
tracked."'" 5 Most important, however, are examples that Al Qaeda utilizes
secure Web sites to plan and coordinate terrorist attacks, including the Sep-
tember 11 th attacks."
6
"lO Renwick McLean, Madrid Suspects Tied to E-mail Ruse, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr.
28, 2006 (describing how the perpetrators of Al Qaeda's 2004 Madrid train bombings com-
municated with other members of the operational cell by saving messages for one another in
the draft sections of pre-selected email accounts).
"' Hinnen, supra note 105, at 10-12.
112 Officials: Alleged Paymaster in Custody, CNN, Mar. 4, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/south/03/03/pakistan.arrests/.
, Terrorists Turn, supra note 15.
114 Id.
115 Hinnen, supra note 105, at 15.
116 See discussion infra Part I (describing Al Qaeda operations planner Abu Zubaydah's




6. Hydra Web Links
Terrorists wishing to communicate particularly sensitive or timely in-
formation have recently employed the hydra web link technique in which
numerous links to the same video or message are posted on a particular site
or e-mail chat room."7 The viewers of the message are encouraged to copy
and repost the communication in other forums and sites in order to prevent
the message from being intercepted before it is broadly disseminated to its
target online audience.'1 8 As an example, the extremist online facilitator,
Irhaby 007, posted an Al Qaeda in Iraq video entitled "All is for Allah's
Religion" on the Web site www.alaflam.net/wdkld 9 and posted links to
"numerous outlets where visitors could find the video. In the event that one
of the sites was disabled, many other sources were available as backups.




One of the newest techniques exploited by terrorist operatives is to visit
the Spam Mimic Web site, http://www.spammimic.com, and "embed en-
crypted messages in span in order to disguise the fact that confidential
data has been exchanged."' 12' According to the SANS Institute, users wish-
ing to transfer secret messages need only visit the site, "choose 'encode'
from the menu, type in a short message, and press enter. This generates a
realistic spain message with the secret message embedded inside it."'
122
Upon receipt of the message, the end recipient of the span message can
then visit the "Spam Mimic Web site to 'decode' the spam, and retrieve the
original message.
123
III. THE RISE OF THE CYBER JIHAD
A. Onward to Terror by Way of the Internet
While terrorist networks have long exploited various media and commu-
nications technologies,'24 the first Web site designed for the purpose of




121 Betancourt/SANS INSTITUTE, supra note 95, at 5.
122 id.
123 Id
124 For more than thirty-five years, terrorists have exploited the mass media to maximize
the impact of their operations on civilian populations. The first televised terrorist attack was
the March 31, 1970 Japanese Red Army hijacking of a Japanese Airlines B727. Lasting
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promoting an Islamic extremist agenda did not emerge until the mid-to-late
1990s. In 1996, Babar Ahmad, a young Palestinian studying in London,
launched the Azzam.com Web site, named in honor of Al Qaeda co-
founder Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's spiritual mentor and one of
the leading Arab-Afghan jihadists in Afghanistan during the 1980s.'25 Ac-
cording to Evan Kohlmann, Azzam.com "was the very first real al Qaeda
Web site. It taught an entire generation about jihad,"'2 6 and spread extrem-
ist sentiment by exploiting the global reach of the Internet with inciteful
messages and professional-looking imagery from ongoing conflicts in
Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan during the 1990s.127 Most signifi-
cantly, Azzam.com served as a cyber jihad portal connecting Islamic ex-
tremist sympathizers to sister sites and message boards, such as Qoqaz.net
and Waaqiah.com, both of which solicited funds for the jihad and recruited
volunteers to attend terrorist training camps.
128
While Azzam.com was eventually removed from the Internet, its exis-
tence, alongside dozens of other extremist sites, signified a new era in in-
ternational terrorism.1 29 As a spokesman for Azzam.com told the Wall
Street Journal in late 2001, "one cannot shut down the Internet."'' 3 Indeed,
the number and sophistication of extremist-related Web sites continued to
eighty-five hours, the hijacking transpired at airports in Fukuoka, Japan and Seoul, South
Korea. After the Japanese Deputy Minister of Trade successfully offered himself up as
hostage in place of the 80 remaining hostages, the plane flew into North Korea, where the
attackers were granted political asylum. The plane safely returned to Japan with the crew
and government minister on board. Airliner hijackings had entered the television age. PE-
TER ST. JOHN, AIR PIRACY, AIRPORT SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 23-24
(1991). Less than five months after the Japanese hijacking, the largest and "most remark-
able event in the history of aerial piracy" involving five airliners, five governments (U.S,
Germany, Switzerland, Israel, and Britain) and 769 hostages was carried out by the Pales-
tinian Liberation Front ("PFLP"). Id. A TWA B707 flying from Frankfurt to New York was
diverted to Dawson's Field. Simultaneously, a Swissair DC8 flying from Zurich to New
York was hijacked. The third plane commandeered was an El Al B707 flying from New
York to Tel Aviv with a stop in Amsterdam. The fourth airliner hijacked that afternoon was
a Pan American jumbo jet, which was taken by two men who had failed to get on the El Al
New York to Tel Aviv flight. The men directed the Pan-American jet to Cairo where the
passengers were given eight minutes to vacate the plane before the $20 million aircraft was
blown up. Finally, on September 8, the PFLP hijacked a British BOAC VC10 flying from
London to Bahrain and Bombay in order to free one of the hijackers who had been cap-
tured. Four of the five planes were ultimately destroyed, representing a loss to the airlines
of $52 million. Id.
125 See generally EvAN KOHLMANN, AL QAIDA'S JIHAD IN EUROPE (2004); ROHAN GUNA-
RATNA, INSIDE AL QAEDA (2002).





130 Stephanie Gruner & Gautam Naik, Extremist Sites Under Heightened Scrutiny, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 7, 2001.
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grow in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as terrorist groups and their spon-
sors realized the enormous operational potential of the Internet. 3 ' In the
United States, several Al Qaeda and Hamas-front charities openly ex-
ploited the Internet for indoctrination, fundraising, and recruitment pur-
poses related to terrorism.1
2
For instance, the Illinois-based Benevolence International Foundation
(BIF) raised millions of dollars in the late 1990s for the covert support of
Islamic extremism, in part by soliciting funds for what BIF described as
"orphans" and other victims of war in Muslim conflict zones.'3 3 The BIF
Web site offered donors a variety of ways to contribute funds for "charity,"
including online checking, debit, and credit card services, as well as elec-
tronic stock donations.'34 On November 19, 2002, the U.S. Department of
the Treasury designated BIF a Specially Designated Global Terrorist en-
tity 35 whose leadership "worked with others including members of Al
Qaeda to purchase rockets, mortars, rifles, and offensive and defensive
bombs, and to distribute them to various mujahideen camps, including
camps operated by al Qaida."'
136
Several other individuals and organizations operating in the United
States during the late 1990s and early 2000s exploited the Internet to pro-
mote and materially support Islamic terrorism. Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, a
Saudi Arabian computer science doctoral student at the University of Idaho
developed and maintained content for more than fifteen Islamic extremist
Web sites and Internet chat rooms "which contained materials designed
and intended to recruit mujahideen and raise funds for violent jihad."'
' 37
Among the various items that al-Hussayen posted on his Web sites was the
followingfatwa 138 posted at www.alasr.ws in June 2001, just three months
prior to the September 11 th attacks:
[T]he Mujahid (warrior) must kill himself if he knows that this will lead to killing a
great number of the enemies, and that he will not be able to kill them without killing
himself first, or demolishing a center vital to the enemy or its military force, and so on.
This is not possible except by involving the human element in the operation. In this
131 Whitlock, supra note 126; WEIMANN, supra note 14, 124-125.
132 See generally COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TASKFORCE REPORT, TERRORIST
FINANCING (2002) (providing an in-depth analysis of terrorists' exploitation of charities for
fundraising and facilitation purposes).
133 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 31, at 109.
134 See Benevolence International Foundation archived Web site,
http://web.archive.org/web/20030207191346/www.benevolence.org/donate.asp.
135 Press Release, U.S. Department of Treasury, Treasury Designates Benevolence Inter-
national Foundation and Related Entities as Financiers of Terrorism, Nov. 19, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3632.htm.
136 id.
137 Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. A1-Hussayen, No. 03-040 (D.
Idaho 2004).
138 A fatwa is "a legal opinion or decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader."
1vERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 598 (11 th ed. 2003).
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new era, this can be accomplished with the modem means of bombing or bringing
down an airplane on an important location that will cause the enemy great losses.
Interrogation transcripts of detainees at the U.S. military base at Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba, released by the Department of Defense in early 2006, also
make frequent references to how the detainees were inspired to join Al Qaeda
and the Taliban prior to September 11, 2001 byfatwas they viewed online."4°
Islamic extremists were successful during the late 1990s in utilizing the
Internet to promote their jihad agendas. Many of these Web sites were quite
overt in their jihad purpose and message. For instance, an April 2001 version
of the London-based Global Jihad Fund ("GJF") Web site,14' openly solicited
funds for the jihad: "The jihad can be supported by two types [sic]: 1) By
sending your donations directly to the jihad orgs in potentially hot countries;
2) By sending your donations to the jihad support network in potentially cold
countries (e.g., Kosova)."'' 42 The site included bank account numbers and in-
structions on how to contribute to jihad movements. 43 The Web site also
posted cyber links to the Web sites of terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, Ja-
maat-e-Islami, and the Taliban, and provided bank account information for the
Al Rashid Trust and the Pakistan-based Al Qaeda affiliated movements Harkat
ul Mujahideen and Lashkar Taiba.144 Shortly after the September 1 lth attacks,
President Bush and the United Nations ("U.N.") identified these groups as
major financial and logistical supporters of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 4 Addi-
tionally, behind a link for "Jihad military training," the GJF site provided e-
mail contact information for jihadist sympathizers interested in becoming in-
volved in violent Islamic extremist activities: "Training for the mujahideen in
several countries whose names cannot be disclosed here. For jihad training
mail jtraining@muslimsonline.com."' 46
139 See Criminal Indictment, United States v. AI-Hussayen, No. 03-040 (D. Idaho 2003)
[hereinafter AI-Hussayen Criminal Indictment].
140 Reprocessed Combatant Status Review Tribunal and Administrative Review Board
Documents, Testimony of Detainees Before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, (re-
leased Mar. 3, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt/index.html.
141 See Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org/about/about.php., explaining that We-
barchive.org "was founded to build an 'Internet library,' with the purpose of offering per-
manent access for researchers, historians, and scholars to historical collections that exist in
digital format." Id.





145 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001).
146 Global Jihad Fund, supra note 142.
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B. Post-September 11 th Cyber Jihad Environment
Following September 1 th, a number of the most notorious terrorist Web
sites, such as Azzam.com and Al Qaeda's http://www.alneda.com' 47 were shut
down, but hundreds of other sites directly affiliated with terrorist groups
emerged in their place.148 Overall, domestic and international efforts to combat
terrorists' use of the Internet have been anemic at best. 149 Complex legal and
investigative enforcement challenges have crippled joint initiatives restricting
the use of the Internet for terrorist-related activities. This issue goes to the
heart of whether states and international organizations can effectively regulate
and enforce security and legal order in a landless and borderless cyber net-
work.
50
Not only have terror-related Web sites grown in number, but the technical
sophistication and practical application of the sites have also evolved with
astonishing speed and intensity.' 51 Often with just superficial masking of lan-
guage or imagery, notorious terrorist sympathizers, including Al Qaeda re-
cruiters and financiers, maintain engaging, real-time Web sites designed to
inspire and mobilize extremist audiences. 52 Yet, such terror-related Web sites
continue to flourish with minimal threat of enforcement actions.
153
C. Terrorists' Strategic Uses of the Internet
Terrorists today utilize the Internet for a growing number of strategic pur-
poses including: public communications and media promotion; indoctrination
and recruitment; online fundraising; as well as training and operational plan-
ning.5
147 See Thomas, supra note 25, at 115 (reporting that Alneda.com was hosted for a
period of time in the United States).
148 Internet Haganah, Internet Haganah in a Nutshell,
http://haganah.org.il/harchives/003218.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
149 See John D. Podesta & Raj Goyle, Lost in Cyberspace? Finding American Liberties
in a Dangerous Digital World, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 509, 518 (2005) (criticizing the
Bush administration and Congress for failing to implement tougher prevention and en-
forcement measures against cyber terrorism as part of the wave of anti-terrorism legislation
after the September 1 th attacks); see also Katz & Devon, supra note 107.
150 See generally Podesta & Goyle, supra note 149.
151 TERROR ON INTERNET, supra note 14, at 49-171.
152 Internet Haganah, supra note 89 (providing an online library of links to dozens of
highly sophisticated terrorist Web sites and online chat rooms).
153 Since September 11 th, there has not been a single conviction of an individual in the
United States involved in online terrorist activity. See Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Depart-
ment of Justice Terrorism-Related Convictions Since Sept. 11, 2001, June 23, 2006,
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06-crm_388.html.
! 4 Since 1999, a number of scholars have analyzed topics related to terrorists' use of the
Internet. See generally U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DocTRINE COMMAND, CCSINT HANDBOOK
No. 1.02: CYBER OPERATIONS AND CYBER TERRORISM (2005),
http://www.mipt.org/pdf/Cyber-Operations-Cyber-Terrorism.pdf; Gabriel Weimann, Ter-
rorist and Their Tools, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, Apr. 16, 2004,
[Vol. 15
Ending the Cyber Jihad
1. Public Communications
While terrorist groups and their affiliated sympathizers have exploited the
Internet as a communications platform for delivering messages to the media
since the first days of Azzam.com, the latest generation of cyber jihadists use
the medium to deliver announcements crafted to be picked up by the media as
news. Infamously, on May 10, 2004, the notorious leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq,
Abu Musab al Zarqawi, was videotaped beheading American contractor
Nicholas Berg. 5 5 Within hours of the beheading, the video of the execution
was posted on the Al-Ansar Web site and entitled, "Shaykh Abu-Musab al-
Zarqawi slaughters an American infidel with his own hands and threatens
Bush with more."'' 56 A few hours after the video's posting online, it was broad-
cast to tens of millions of viewers on TV channels worldwide, while millions
more viewed the video online.
15 7
Other jihadist Web sites continue to disseminate statements from their lead-
ers and communicate strategic plans and alliances between groups. For exam-
ple, in May 2006, Al Qaeda posted a sixty-three page document written by
Abdul Aziz bin Rasheed al-Anzy, an important Al Qaeda ideologue, on an
extremist Web site, in which religious justification was made for the (foiled)
February 24, 2006 plot to blow up the Abqaiq oil refinery facility in Saudi
Arabia. 58 In 2004, negotiations to merge terrorist networks were conducted
over the Internet between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden.
5 9
When Zarqawi pledged his allegiance to bin Laden in late 2004, extremist
Web sites broke the news.' 60 On January 20, 2006, Al Qaeda operatives posted
a 17-minute recording of Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to
refute American claims that he had been killed in the bombing of an Al Qaeda
hideout.' 6 ' Earlier that month, leaders of a number of insurgency groups in
Iraq used the Internet to communicate a new strategic alliance among terrorist
groups in Iraq and announce the creation of an umbrella body called the Muja-
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3768; Thomas, supra note 25, at 112-16.
(evaluating terrorists' exploitation of the Internet for profiling, anonymous-covert commu-
nications, generating cyber fear, mobilization and recruitment, mitigation of risk, theft and
manipulation of data, and misinformation).
155 War on Terror Digest, BBC MONITORING INT'L REP., supra note 8. This article de-
scribes how Zarqawi delivered a political statement regarding the U.S. occupation of
Iraq prior to executing Nicholas Berg: "We are giving you good news which will dis-
please you. Your worst days are coming, with the help of God. You and your soldiers
will regret the day when your feet touched the land of Iraq and showered your bravery
on shelters of Muslims." Id.
156 id.
157 Web as Weapon, supra note 5.
158 Mariam Fam, Document: Al-Qaida Encourages Oil Attacks, Assoc. PREss, March 2,
2006.
159 Web as Weapon, supra note 5.
160 Bamford, supra note 7; see also Global Terror Alert, Communique from Al-Tawheed
wal Jihad Movement (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) in Iraq,
http://www.globalterroralert.com/zarqawi-bayat.pdf.
161 Bin Laden's No. 2 releases poetry tape, CNN, Jan. 20, 2006.
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heddin Shura Council in Iraq. 162 In 2005, the Al Qaeda-affiliated media opera-
tion, Global Islamic Media Front, began launching a series of online weekly
magazines ("e-zines") updating readers on its international terrorism cam-
paign. 163 Upon release, the e-zines are quickly distributed to a network of cy-
ber jihadists, who repost the e-zine on numerous sites to frustrate removal by
intelligence authorities. 64
2. Indoctrination and Recruitment
In addition to providing a method of outward communication, jihadist Web
sites glorify Islamic militancy in video testimonials of jihad operations. Sym-
pathizers and potential recruits are thereby indoctrinated with virtuous mes-
sages of jihad and martyrdom that justify and legitimize violent action against
non-Muslims. 165
A video entitled "The Attack on the Hotels: 'Badr al-Baghdad,"' posted on a
Zarqawi-affiliated site in December 2005, glorifies strikes on foreign targets in
Iraq by taking viewers inside a terrorist cell's pre-attack surveillance. 166 The
video chronicles planning and practice runs for the suicide bombings of the
Sheraton Ishtar and Meridian Palestine Hotels in Baghdad. 167 The video in-
cludes laudatory biographical profiles of the suicide bombers as well as their
martyrdom statements.1
68
Palestinian Islamic Jihad ("PI") exploits the Internet to glorify the purported
courage and selflessness of suicide bombers who attack Israeli targets. 169 The
aim is to inspire new sympathizers and recruits to commit to sacrifices for the
terrorist group. 170 Visitors to PIJ's Qudsway.net Web site hear background
music and the voice of the group's founder, Fathi Shiqaqi, proclaiming that the
162 Hala Jaber, Zarqawi sleeps in suicide belt, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 22, 2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2003822,00.html.
163 Thomas Hegghammer, Global Jihadism After the Iraq War, 60 MIDDLE EAST J. 1, 17
(2006) (describing a number of Al Qaeda online magazines, including: Sawt al-Jihad
[Voice of Jihad] (29 editions) Mu'askar al-Battar [Camp of the Sabre] (22 editions), and al-
Khansa (1 edition) and Dharwat al-Sanam [Peak of the Hump]); see also Bouchaib Silm, A
More Animated Approach to Jihad, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Jan. 11, 2006 (describ-
ing activities and postings on the Al Qaeda-affiliated Global Islamic Media Front Web site).
164 See discussion supra Part II.C.6 (discussing terrorists' use of hydra web links to
distribute information online).
165 Hegghammer, supra note 163, at 11-18.
166 BATTLES OF MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 6.
167 Id.
168 id.
169 THE PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS INTERNET
WEBHOSTS, INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM INFO. CTR. AT THE CTR. FOR SPECIAL STUDIES
(2005) [hereinafter PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE], available at
http://www.intelligence.org.ilI/eng/eng-n/internet_el 205.htm.
170 See generally ROBERT PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TER-
RORISM (2005) (providing an in-depth historical analysis of the indoctrination, recruitment,
training and deployment of suicide bombers worldwide).
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"Islamic nation's covenant [is] with blood."'' The site features the picture of
the suicide bomber who carried out the December 5, 2005, attack on a shop-
ping mall in Netanya, Israel, that killed five Israeli citizens. The caption reads:
"The suicide bomber Abu Sa'ad . . . waited for the Zionists to approach,
smiled a broad smile and blew himself up.' ' 172 The site also includes official




According to Todd Hinnen, a terrorist financing expert who serves on the
Bush administration's National Security Council, terrorists use the Internet in
"four primary ways to solicit and collect funding and equipment in support of
terrorist operations."'' 74 Terrorists:
(1) solicit donations, indoctrinate adherents, share information, and recruit supporters
directly via Web site chat groups, and targeted electronic mailings;
(2) they take advantage of charitable organizations, soliciting funds with the express
purpose of clothing, feeding, and educating a population, but with the covert intent of
exploiting contributors' largesse to fund acts of violence;
(3) they perpetrate online crimes such as identity and credit card theft, intellectual
property piracy, and fraud, and support their mission with the proceeds of such crimes;
(4) and they use the Internet as a pervasive, inexpensive, and anonymous medium of
communication to organize and implement fund raising activities.
7 5
The U.K.-based Hamas front-organization Interpal is one of the largest
Internet-based fundraising organizations and utilizes many of the above
methodologies. In addition to being a principal conduit through which
funds are funneled (under the guise of charity) to Hamas, "Interpal is [a]
fundraising... coordination point for other Hamas-affiliated charities...
[As such, Interpal] supervis[es] activities of charities, develop[s] new
charities in targeted areas, instruct[s] how funds should be transferred from
one charity to another, and even determine[es] public relations policy.'
7 6
Despite enforcement actions by the United States and Israel to freeze the
assets of Interpal and to shut down the Web site, the organization continues
to operate and raise funds online. 1
7
Some prominent Islamic extremists issue public statements and writings
referring followers to Web sites that provide instructions on how to exploit
the Internet to raise funds for their deadly campaigns. Imam Samudra, In-
donesian Al Qaeda terrorist and the leader of the 2002 Al Qaeda Bali
171 PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 169.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Hinnen, supra note 105, at 10.
175 Id.
176 U.S. Charities Funding Hamas, supra note 67.
177 Interpal, http://www.interpal.org/web/101.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
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bombings, 78 recently released an autobiography from his jail cell contain-
ing a chapter entitled, "Hacking, Why Not?" '179 The chapter "details basic
information on money laundering, online credit card fraud, and computer
programming languages, exhorting all would-be terrorists to use cyber-
space to further jihad."' 80
Other terrorist networks have combined multiple communications media
to raise funds for terrorism-related operations. For example, Hezbollah
maintains its own popular television station, Al Manar,' 8' which is broad-
cast throughout the Middle East, and promoting violence against Israel and
the United States. Al-Manar's Web site urges contributions "for the suste-
nance of the Intifadah" and provides bank accounts in Lebanon to which
donations can be made for the purpose of carrying out violence against
Israeli interests.
82
Each of these Internet fundraising techniques illustrates terrorists' tech-
nological sophistication and strategic manipulation of readily-available
technology in order to raise funds for militant campaigns.
4. Operational Training and Strategic Planning
Many violent extremist Web sites have become one-stop terrorist training
and planning centers. As traditional means of travel and communication have
become increasingly difficult for many terrorist operatives since September
11 th, 183 a number of terrorist-related sites have expanded their use of the Inter-
net as a command and control platform.' 84 With horrifying openness and au-
dacity, jihadi webmasters utilize multimedia Web technologies to create vir-
tual training and planning command centers.
"If you want to conduct an attack, you will find what you need on the Inter-
net."' 185 During 2005 and early 2006, a series of high-quality training films shot
178 Alan Sipress, An Indonesian's Prison Memoir Takes Holy War into Cyberspace,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2004, at A19; Alleged Terror Hackers Arrested, JAKARTA POST, Aug.
24, 2006, (reporting that a follow-up investigation resulted in the August 16, 2006 arrest of
Agung Setyadi in Indonesia for smuggling a computer into prison for Imam Samudera and
the August 12, 2006 arrest of Mohammad Prabowo for registering the anshar.net Web site
on the UK hosting site, www.openhosting.co.uk, as a tool for exchanging information on
terrorist operations).
179 Sipress, supra note 178.
180 Podesta & Goyle, supra note 149, at 518.
181 See Al Manar Television,
http://www.manartv.com.lb/NewsSite/News.aspx?language=en (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
On March 23, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department designated A1-Manar as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist Entity pursuant to Executive Order 12334. Press Release, U.S.
Treasury Dep't, U.S. Designates A1-Manar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist En-
tity: Television is Arm of Hizballah Terrorist Network (Mar. 23, 2006).
182 ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, supra note 10.
183 See 9/11 STAFF REPORT ON TERRORIST TRAVEL, supra note 3 1.
184 See discussion supra Part Ill.
185 Terrorists Turn, supra note 15.
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in Afghanistan were posted on Web sites associated with Al Qaeda affiliated
groups. These Web videos include instructions for conducting a roadside as-
sassination, raiding a house, shooting a rocket propelled grenade, blowing up a
car, attacking a village, destroying a bridge and firing an SA-7 surface-to-air
missile. 11
6
Al Qaeda operatives planning the March 14, 2004, Madrid train bombings
studied a report on the Al Qaeda-affiliated Global Islamic Media front Web
site, "in which a committee of al-Qaeda experts suggested an attack in Spain
before the general elections of March 14, 2004." ls17 In late 2003, a Web site
entitled "Al Qa'ida University for Jihad Sciences" offered an online instruction
manual for various terrorist attacks including "suicide operations."'l88 In Au-
gust 2005, a site maintained by an Iraqi insurgency group posted an instruc-
tional pamphlet entitled "The New Road to Mesopotamia" for prospective
foreign fighters seeking to enter Iraq to fight against U.S. and allied forces.1
8 9
The pamphlet included very specific tactical recommendations for crossing the
Syria-Iraq border, based on what appeared to be first-hand accounts of fighters
who had previously made the trip:
Arrange your trip to take place over two stages. The first stage is to learn the area, the
people and the roads, and then head toward the city of Dayr AI-Zawr [Syria] near the
Iraqi border. It is recommended to enter the city using a car and do not carry large
sums of money. If anyone asks, say you are here on a vacation and have come to go
fishing in the Euphrates-therefore, bring some fishing equipment and another person
with you so you won't look suspicious. It is an inexpensive region and usually you will
end up pa~ing $300 for 15 days in a four star hotel. A tank of gas will cost you around
$10 ....
A number of other Web sites include remarkably detailed instructional
booklets on how to make suicide explosive belts. For instance, a 26-minute
video on the Al-Ansar forum site discovered by the SITE Institute in Decem-
ber 2004 "shows how to estimate the impact of an explosion, how best to ar-
range the shrapnel for maximum destruction, how to strap the belt onto the
bomber's body, [and] even how to avoid the migraine headache that can come
from exposure to the recommended explosive chemicals."' 91
186 Id.
1s7 Pamela Rolfe, 29 Indicted for Roles in Madrid Bombings, WASH. POST, Apr. 11,
2006.
188 ILAN BERMAN, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL, EURASIA SECURITY WATCH No.
7 (2003), available at http://www.afpc.org/esw/esw7.shtm (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
189 GLOBAL TERROR ALERT, AL-MUHAJIR AL-ISLAMI THE ROAD THROUGH SYRIA TO
JIHAD IN IRAQ 1-3 (2005), http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0805/roadtoiraqO805.pdf.
190 Id.
191 Web as Weapon, supra note 5, at Al. According to its Web site, the U.S.-based
SITE Institute:
locates links among terrorist entities and their supporters. Once a potential terrorist en-
tity is identified, either through SITE's ongoing internal research or via a client's spe-
cific query, SITE conducts a comprehensive investigation on the target and entities af-
filiated to it, scouring corporate records, tax forms, credit reports, videotapes, internet




Other sites have published a 15-page document authored by Al Qaeda opera-
tional leader Mustafa Setmariam Nasar with instructions for deploying poten-
tial biological weapons agents. 192 The document explains how to develop a
crude biological weapons delivery mechanism: "inject carrier animals, like
rats, with the virus and how to extract microbes from infected blood... and
how to dry them so that they can be used with aerosol delivery system."'
93
Online manuals discovered by the Terrorism Research Center instruct opera-
tional activities on "how to extract explosive materials from missiles and land
mines. Another offered a country-by-country list of explosive materials avail-
able in western markets .... 194
The cyber jihad watchdog organization, Society for Internet Research, has
noted that certain instructional documents illustrate a nexus between online
extremist communications and subsequent terrorist operations.' 95 On Septem-
ber 25, 2005, a known Al Qaeda facilitator using the name Abu Muhammad
al-Hilali published a call to action on the Internet in which he provided in-
structions for additional terrorist attacks on the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt fol-
lowing suicide bombings in October 2004 and July 2005.196 The communica-
tion is considered to be the first operational command to emerge on the Inter-
net from a 1,601-page book on jihad authored by Islamic extremist Abu
Mus'ab al-Suri. 197 This direct nexus between online ideological communica-
tions and subsequent attacks demonstrates the growing operational signifi-
cance of the Internet to terrorist groups.198
IV. U.S. RESPONSES TO THE CYBER JIHAD
Despite notice beginning as early as the mid-1990s that terrorists were
using the Internet as an operational and communications hub,' 99 the U.S.
has fundamentally failed to respond to the seriousness of the cyber jihad
threat.2 ° Instead of developing and implementing domestic and interna-
See SITE Institute, http://www.siteinstitute.org/mission.htmi.
192 Id.
193 Terrorists Turn, supra note 15, at Al.
194 Id.
195 See REUVEN PAZ, AL-QAEDA'S SEARCH FOR NEW FRONTS: INSTRucTONS FOR JIHADI
AcTwrrY IN EGYPT AND SINAI, SOC'Y. FOR INTERNET RESEARCH 1-3, 10 (2005) (citing Abu
Muhammad al-Hilali, Risalah ila Ah al-Thughourfi Sina', A Message to the People of the
Frontiers of Sinai, http://www.alhesbah.org/v/showthread.php?t=33241).
196 Id.
197 Id. See Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, Da'wah lil-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah al-'Alamiyyah (A
Call for the Islamic Global Resistance),
www.fsboa.com/vw/index.php?subject=7&rec=27&tit=tit&pa--0 (last visited Aug. 22,
2006).
198 PAz, supra note 195.
199 ARQUILLA & RONFELDT, supra note 119 (providing notice in 1996 of the threat posed
by cyber operational planning).
200 See Podesta & Goyle, supra note 149, at 516-522 (criticizing the Bush administration
and Congress for failing to implement tougher prevention and enforcement measures
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tional regulatory measures to prevent terrorists and other criminals from
gaining access to and exploiting the Internet, policymakers have focused
their energies on national-level laws that rely heavily on deterrence and
prosecution of online terrorist activities.
This strategy has failed to curb the exponential growth in Internet use as
an operational center for cyber jihadists: U.S. law enforcement officials
have yet to successfully prosecute a single case against a reputed cyber
jihadist.20' These failures illustrate a lack of imagination and courage to
institute fundamental reforms that would make the Internet and the world a
safer place.
A. Congressional Action: A Failure to Respond Creatively to the Threat
Since September 11 th, the U.S. government has taken a number of regu-
latory steps to bolster Internet security and prevent the Web from becom-
ing a breeding ground and safe-haven for terrorist activity.20 2 Unfortu-
nately, these measures have been insufficient and misdirected. Specifically,
provisions addressing Internet security issues focus almost solely on
strengthening penalties for cyber attacks on U.S. government infrastruc-
ture.203 By focusing exclusively on the deterrence dimension of combating
online terrorist-related activity, lawmakers have failed to consider grand-
scale prevention measures to disrupt cyber jihad activities.
1. U.S.A. PATRIOT Act
In the weeks following the September 1 th attacks, Congress passed the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
against cyber terrorism as part of the wave of anti-terrorism legislation after the September
11 th attacks).
201 But see Superceding Indictment, United States v. Infocom Corp., No. 3:02-CR-052
(N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 17, 2002) (pending criminal case involving an ISP that allegedly
provided material support to terrorist groups by developing, hosting, and maintaining Web
sites which incited violent action against the U.S. and raised funds for terrorism-affiliated
entities).
202 Arguably the most significant legislative action taken in the wake of the September
11 th attacks was the enactment of the U.S.A Patriot Act. Uniting and Strengthening Amer-
ica by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism ("PA-
TRIOT") Act Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.). Cyber
terrorism-related provisions of the PATRIOT Act revise prohibitions and penalties regard-
ing fraud and related activity in connection with computers to include specified cyber-
terrorism offenses. The Patriot Act also directs the Attorney General to establish regional
computer forensic laboratories, and to support existing laboratories, to develop specified




quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("PATRIOT Act"),2°
which was designed to address inadequacies in our nation's homeland se-
curity and to provide the necessary tools to address these problems.0 5 In
the area of cyber terrorism, however, the Act narrowly focuses on stiffer
penalties for individuals who carry out offensive cyber attacks resulting in
physical injury to American citizens, damage to U.S. facilities, or threaten
public health or safety.2 °" The legislation also authorizes additional funding
for forensic laboratories to investigate cyber crimes. 2 7 However, the law
does not include penalties for using the Internet to promote or communi-
cate terrorism-related activities unrelated to cyber attacks. Instead, Con-
gress appears content to allow terrorism-related activity on the Internet to
be governed by anti-terrorism statutes.20 8
The Bush administration has emphasized that the PATRIOT Act encour-
ages ISPs and e-mail providers to act as cyber watchdogs and report suspi-
209cious online activities. In a July 2005 speech, President Bush argued that
the PATRIOT Act enhances the security of the Internet by protecting ISPs
from civil lawsuits "when they give information to law enforcement when
it would help law enforcement prevent a threat of death or serious in-
jury.,'210 The statutory provision, however, encourages rather than requires
ISPs to report threatening information on their sites.2 1' To date, there is no
204 Id.
205 Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet, The Patriot Act Helps Keep America
Safe (June 9, 2005) [hereinafter The Patriot Act Helps Keep America Safe], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050609.html.
206 18 U.S.C. § 1030a(5) (2001). The PATRIOT Act mandates criminal penalties of at
least 1 year in prison where an individual carries out a cyber attack which results in aggre-
gate damages over $5,000 to private computers, causes a public health or safety threat,
results in injury or death of an individual or "damage affecting a computer system used by
or for a government entity in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense,
or national security. Id.
207 28 U.S.C. § 509 Sec. 2357(3)(c) (2000). Section 816(a) of The PATRIOT Act author-
izes the Attorney General to establish regional forensic laboratories and to support existing
forensic labs to bolster their abilities in examining and investigating cyber crime. Pub. L.
No. 107-56, Title VIII, § 816, 115 Stat. 385 (2001).
208 See Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000) ("[p]roviding material
support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization").
209 See Press Release, President Discusses Patriot Act, Ohio State Highway Patrol Acad-
emy, Columbus, Ohio (June 9, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/print/20050609-2.html; The Patriot Act
Helps Keep America Safe, supra note 205.
210 The Patriot Act Helps Keep America Safe, supra note 205.
211 PATRIOT Act, Title VIII, § 225(h) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)2B (2000). Sec-
tion 225(h) of the PATRIOT Act stipulates that
No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire or electronic
communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person (including any officer,
employee, agent, or other specified person thereof) that furnishes any information, fa-
cilities, or technical assistance in accordance with a court order or request for emer-
gency assistance under this this chapter for electronic surveillance or physical search.
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available evidence to suggest that ISPs, Web hosts, or e-mail providers
have increased their monitoring or reporting of suspected terrorism-related
emails since September 1 th.212 Furthermore, the voluntary nature of this
measure limits the likelihood that an ISP would shut down a Web site at
the request of the government out of a fear that such action will raise civil
liberties and prior restraint concerns.213
On the other hand, the PATRIOT Act does expand federal surveillance
powers regarding e-mails and other electronic Internet communication by
permitting the National Security Agency to filter and review potential ter-
rorism-related e-mails and Web postings originating abroad.2 4 Due to lim-
ited publicly available information regarding ongoing intelligence activi-
ties and pending terrorism investigations, the impact this provision has had
on the government's intelligence gathering capabilities is unclear.215 How-
ever, it appears that this surveillance authority was used in a number of
terrorism related cases involving associates who maintained Web sites and
conducted terrorism activities via e-mail.21 6
50 U.S.C. § 1805(i) (2000).
212 Molnar, supra note 47, at 26-28.
213 See Dino Bozonelos & Galen Stocking, The Effects Of Counter-Terrorism On Cyber-
space: A Case Study Of Azzam.Com, 2003 J. INST. JUST. INT'L STUD. 88, 88-90 (2003).
Internet scholars who advocate for strong free-speech protections online, such as Uni-
versity of Miami Law School Professor Michael Froomkin, argue that the doctrine of
'prior restraint' which prevents the government from blocking the publication of in-
formation except where that information poses a threat to the national security of the
country, applies to content on the Internet. Prior restraint proponents argue that the
government should be greatly limited in its ability to investigate and monitor Internet
activities. E-mail from Michael Froomkin, Professor of Law, University of Miami
School of Law, to Benjamin R. Davis (Mar. 24, 2006, 21:38:45 EST)(on file with
author); see also Raphael Prober, Note: Shutter Control: Confronting Tomorrow's Tech-
nology With Yesterday's Regulations, 19 J.L. & POL. 203, 220-21 (2003) (describing
the case law relating to the doctrine of 'prior restraint' and its application in the publi-
cation of national security related articles); Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 489
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Doe v. Ashcroft, the court held that the disclosure bar was not nar-
rowly tailored to further Government's interest in protecting the integrity and efficacy of
international terrorism investigations in violation of the First Amendment free speech pro-
tections where an Internet service provider that had received an FBI National Security
Letter that brought action challenging the Patriot Act provisions authorizing such let-
ters and permanently barring disclosure of receipt of such letters. Id. The court also
found that the NSL violated the Fourth Amendment as applied. Id; see also Craig M.
Glasgow, Note, Doe v. Ashcroft and its Place in the Judicial Trend: How the Courts Have
Advanced Civil Liberties In Step With Advances In Technology, 10 U. PGH J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 3, 4 (2006) (analyzing the recent Doe v. Ashcroft decision and its potential impact
for placing boundaries on the government's ability to investigate online activities).
214 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3123 (2000).
215 See Gellman, supra note 37.
216 The most notable of these cases was the 2004 trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. See
AI-Hussayen Criminal Indictment, supra note 139.
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2. Homeland Security Act
Another important piece of cyber terrorism-related legislation was the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (the "Act").2t 7 In addition to establishing
the Department of Homeland Security, the largest reorganization of gov-
ernment in fifty years,218 the legislation bolstered the government's institu-
tional ability to combat offensive cyber terrorist threats. 21 9 The Act author-
izes the Department of Homeland Security to share cyber security informa-
tion and provide technical assistance to state and local governments, as
well as private entities that develop or maintain critical information sys-
tems.220
The law also requires federal judges to consider a number of factors in
determining sentences for individuals found guilty of cyber attacks on U.S.
targets.22' However, in light of lawmakers' repeated efforts to strengthen
penalties for cyber terrorism-related offenses, the Department of Justice
217 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225, 116 Stat. 2135. Section
225 of the Homeland Security Act specifically directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to
review and amend Federal sentencing guidelines and otherwise address crimes involving
fraud in connection with computers and access to protected information, protected com-
puters, or restricted data in interstate or foreign commerce or involving a computer used by
or for the Federal Government. The Act requires that the U.S. Sentencing Commission
report to Congress on actions taken and recommendations regarding statutory penalties for
violations. The Act exempts from criminal penalties any disclosure made by an electronic
communication service to a Federal, State, or local governmental entity if made in the good
faith belief that an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any
person requires disclosure without delay. The Act requires any government entity receiving
such a disclosure to report it to the Attorney General. Id.
218 William B. Cassidy, The Big Push, TRAFFic WORLD, Dec. 11, 2002 at 11 (describing
the largest reshuffle of federal agencies since the Department of Defense was established in
1947, involving the consolidation of 22 separate agencies, including the Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service and Border Patrol into a single department).
219 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (establishing
an Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, as well as defin-
ing information (or cyber) systems among the nation's critical infrastructures).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 2156-57. The Homeland Security Act requires federal sentencing judges who
are evaluating the nature of the criminal offenses related to cyber terrorism activities to:
[C]onsider the following factors and the extent to which the guidelines may or may not
account for them-(i) the potential and actual loss resulting from the offense; (ii) the
level of sophistication and planning involved in the offense; (iii) whether the offense
was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial benefit; (iv)
whether the defendant acted with malicious intent to cause harm in committing the of-
fense; (v) the extent to which the offense violated the privacy rights of individuals
harmed; (vi) whether the offense involved a computer used by the government in fur-
therance of national defense, national security, or the administration of justice; (vii)
whether the violation was intended to or had the effect of significantly interfering with
or disrupting a critical infrastructure; and (viii) whether the violation was intended to
or had the effect of creating a threat to public health or safety, or injury to any person.
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has failed to produce a single conviction in a cyber jihad case since Sep-
tember 11 th.222 Without effective enforcement, deterrence cannot work.
3. False Starts at Reform
The Internet is anonymous, borderless, and remotely accessible. As such,
it is difficult for states to find perpetrators of Internet crimes, and even
more difficult to prosecute extremists for their online activities. Despite the
U.S. government's focus on deterrence and penalties to combat the cyber
jihad, policymakers and cyber security advocates originally considered
imposing increased fiduciary duties on ISPs to monitor and verify user
registration information.223 However, a number of these efforts were
blocked from implementation by business interests reportedly concerned
with added costs and potential exposure to liability.
224
For instance, the Bush administration's National Security Strategy to Se-
cure Cyberspace, released in early 2003, proposed important mandates to
enhance Internet security. 225 The initial proposal envisioned requiring ISPs
to provide firewalls to consumers and holding ISPs liable for content
posted on and activities associated with sites hosted by a particular pro-
vider that resulted in damages from cyber-terrorist attacks. 6 It also pro-
posed establishing an industry-supported cyber security fund and forming
corporate security councils to regularly review business-continuity plans
and risks posed by vendors. 7 The strategic provisions were primarily tar-
geted at bolstering cyber security against offensive cyber attacks, but the
focus on increased monitoring and disclosure duties for providers would
have complemented efforts to limit terrorists' operational use of the Inter-
net.228 The proposed measures would have also forced providers to invest
in the technology and manpower to track data and electronic traffic passing
through their company's servers for potential terrorist activity.
229
222 See Al Goodman, Terrorist Internet Plotter Jailed, CNN.com, Apr. 3, 2006,
http:/www.cnn.com20061WORLDIEurope/04/03spain.justice.
223 Carolyn Duffy Marson, Bush Team Lays Out Cybersecurity Plan, NETWORK WORLD,
Sept. 23, 2002; Tom Foremski A Toothless IT Security Plan, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002;
Aaron Davis, Internet Security Strategy Released, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 15,
2003, at IC; Jonathan Krim, Cyber-Security Strategy Depends on Power of Suggestion,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2003, at El; Jennifer Lee, White House Scales Back Cyberspace
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at A14; Podesta & Goyle, supra note 149, at 520.
224 See Marson, supra note 223; Foremski, supra note 223; Davis, supra note 223; Krim,
supra note 223; Lee, supra note 223.
225 WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, NA-
TIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBER SPACE (2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/.
226 See Marson, supra note 223; Foremski, supra note 223; Davis, supra note 223; Krim,
supra note 223; Lee, supra note 223.
227 See Lee, supra note 223; Podesta & Goyle, supra note 149, at 520.
228 Lee, supra note 223; Podesta & Goyle, supra note 149, at 520.
229 Lee, supra note 223, at 2.
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Ironically, it appears that ISPs may agree, at least in part, with the con-
tention that they have a greater duty to monitor and detect illicit activity on
sites they host. In testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime, Clint N. Smith, President of the Internet Service Providers Associa-
tion, indicated that providers might accept wide-ranging responsibility for
controlling content. Smith testified that, "[t]he successful investigation and
prosecution of crime on the Internet requires a legal framework that bal-
ances the powers of law enforcement, the privacy rights of individuals, and
the responsibilities and liabilities of services providers. 23° Unfortunately,
no legislation has been considered to provide such a framework since
2002, and only two substantive hearings on cyber terrorism issues have
been held in the last three Congresses."'
Yet, Congress and the Bush administration's historical reluctance to in-
tervene in efforts to force systemic improvements on Internet security is-
sues may be shifting course by way of another grave Internet security is-
sue-the proliferation of online child pornography.232 In June 2006, the
House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee held hearings
on online child pornography and sexual solicitation of minors. 233 Legisla-
tive efforts to combat online child pornography may ultimately serve as a
springboard for strengthening ISP and search engine enforcement actions
and responsibilities in combating cyber jihad-associated activities. While
the hearings did not examine terrorism-related issues, a number of ISP
companies and search engine providers, such as EarthLink, Verizon,
Google, Yahoo, and America Online ("AOL"), publicly acknowledged that
they must do more to comply with and enforce policies and laws on the
Internet.23 In partial response to criticism that they have not done enough
230 The Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 3482 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 38 (2002) (statement of
Clint N. Smith, President, United States Internet Service Providers Association) [hereinafter
Smith Testimony].
231 See The Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 3482 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 38 (2002); Terrorist
Use of the Internet for Communications: Before the H. Select Intelligence Comm., 109th
Cong. (2006) (examining the use of the Internet by terrorists, particularly in Iraq, to indoc-
trinate and recruit potential jihadists with ideological messages of hatred and militant Is-
lam).
232 Joshua Brockman, F.B.I. and Justice Dept. Are Faulted Over Child Predators on
Web, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006 (reporting on Congressional hearings where members of
Congress questioned that child pornography cases have increased 445 percent the last four
years).
233 Making the Internet Safe for Kids: The Role fo ISP's and Social Networking Sites:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. On En-
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to combat online child predators, 23' AOL, Microsoft, EarthLink, and
United Online announced the launch of "an aggressive campaign against
child exploitation on the Internet through a new center for child protection
technologies. Through this center, industry leaders will come together to
develop and deploy technological solutions to disrupt predators' ability to
use the Internet to abuse children. 236 Other ISPs with representatives at the
hearings, such as Comcast, announced that they were voluntarily extending
the retention of all IP user data to 180 days to aid in law enforcement ef-
forts.237 Perhaps most significantly, many of the representatives from these
ISP and search engine companies described renewed efforts to comply
with their statutory requirements to report child exploitation to the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children ("NCMEC"). 2 8 In addition,
Representative Diana DeGette announced during the hearing that she
planned to introduce legislation that would require ISPs to retain all IP data
for one year,239 a significant expansion to the current ninety day data pres-
240ervation requirement.
The about-face by ISPs and search engine companies illustrated during
the June 2006 Congressional hearings is likely due to the Executive
Branch's tougher enforcement approach with Internet providers. In April
2006, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales suggested that ISPs retain user
data for a "reasonable amount of time" to improve efforts to combat online
235 See ISP Data Retention Takes Center Stage at Child Porn Hearing, WASH. INTERNET
DAILY, Apr. 7, 2006 (reporting on a Congressional hearing in April 2006 where a witness
stated that up to 40 percent of ISPs do not comply with government requests to preserve IP
data in Internet crime investigations).
236 U.S. Rep. Edward Whitfield (R-KY) Holds a Hearing on Internet Service Providers
and Social Networking Sites' Roles in Children's Use of the Internet, CONG. QUARTERLY
(June 27, 2006) (statement of Elizabeth Banker, vice President and Associate General
Counsel, Yahoo).
237 Id. (statement of Gerard Lewis, Vice President, Deputy General Counsel, and Chief
Privacy Officer, Comcast)..
238 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b) (2000) (creating a duty to report child pornography on the
Internet to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children's Cybertip line). The
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, http://www.missingkids.com/. Accord-
ing to its Web site:
[T]he National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, in cooperation with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Innocent Images Task Force, the Bureau of Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement, the US Department of Justice's Internet Crimes
Against Children Task Force Units, and the US Postal Service work together with
shared access to information to fight Internet crimes against children.
U.S. Rep. Edward Whitfield (R-KY) Holds a Hearing on Internet Service Providers and
Social Networking Sites' Roles in Children's Use of the Internet, CONG. QUARTERLY (June
27, 2006) (statement of Rep. Diana DeGette).
239 Hearing: Making the Internet Safe for Kids, supra note 233, at 46.
240 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f(2) (2000) (imposing the 90 day retention of data requirement
only upon specific request by a government entity).
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child predators.24 This was a reversal of the prior Justice Department posi-
tion of opposition to strengthening data-retention laws.242 There are also
indications that stronger data retention laws are aimed not only at combat-
ing cyber predators, but cyber jihadists as well. Indeed, in a series of pri-
vate meetings with Internet industry leaders in May and June 2006, the
Justice Department reportedly requested that ISPs and search engine com-
panies retain IP data as well as lists of e-mail traffic and Web searches for
up to two years in an effort to improve government efforts to fight online
243child predators and Internet-based terrorist activities.
B. Criminal Enforcement
In the rare instances of successful law enforcement identification, track-
ing, and detention of individuals for online terrorism-related activities,
federal prosecutors have had difficulty overcoming high Constitutional
hurdles that protect most forms of speech. In the 2004 trial of Sami Omar
Al-Hussayen, 244 a Saudi national accused of providing material support to
terrorist groups through affiliated Web sites, an Idaho jury found the de-
fendant not guilty of terrorism-related charges due, in part, to free speech
protections laid out by the Supreme Court in its landmark Brandenburg v.
Ohio decision. 245
In Brandenburg, the Court determined that speech must be "directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action" in order to be suppressed or prosecuted by the govern-
ment.24 6 In the Al-Hussayen case, the jury was not convinced that the de-
fendant's posting of inciteful material calling for violent action against the
United States and soliciting financial support for Islamic fighters rose to
241 U.S. Att'y Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children (April 20, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag-speech_060420.html.
242 Declan McCullagh, Gonzales Pressures ISPs on Data Retention, CNET NEws.COM,
May 26, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6077654.html [hereinafter Gonzales
Pressures ISPs] (describing the Bush administration's earlier opposition to data retention
laws).
243 See Jon Swartz, U.S. Asks Internet Firms to Save Data, USA TODAY, June 1, 2006;
Feds Put Squeeze on Internet Firms, CNN.CoM, May 30, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/TECH/internet/05/30/intemet.records/index.html; Gonzales
Pressures ISPs, supra note 242.
244 Al-Hussayen Criminal Indictment, supra note 139.
245 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.); see also Thomas E.
Crocco, Inciting Terrorism on the Internet: An Application of Brandenburg to Terrorist
Websites, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 451, 482-84 (2004) (proposing a narrowly ex-
panded standard of "imminence" for online terrorist activities).
246 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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the level of a convictable offense under the Brandenburg "imminent dan-
ger standard.
247
In United States v. Ahmad, a Palestinian national who maintained Al
Qaeda's Azzam.com Web site presents the latest challenge for federal
counter-terrorism prosecutors in pursuing justice against cyber jihadists 48
While the Ahmad indictment implicates the defendant's online terrorism-
related activities, prosecutors are mindful of the failures of the Al-
Hussayen trial.249 The core of the government's case against Al-Hussayen
focused on his online activities.25° In the Ahmad indictment, however, the
charges focus on other aspects of the defendant's material support for ter-
rorism, such as recruiting trainees for terrorist training camps.2 1' In doing
so, prosecutors seek to illustrate the broader impact of the defendant's cy-
ber operations, while minimizing the defendant's speech activities that
damaged the government's case against al-Hussayen.
Ultimately, cyber jihadists "walk a fine line between free speech and
criminality when they set up Web sites. There are many factors you have to
consider, '252 said Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert O'Neill, prosecutor in
United States v. Babar Ahmad.253 Investigators must consider whether
there are "legitimate connections to what is considered a jihadist group.
You have to look at the Webmaster's background, [and the beliefs] that
247 Failed Prosecution of UI Student May Aid Terror Cause, Attorneys Say, Assoc.
PRESS, Apr. 27, 2005.
248 See also Superseding Indictment, United States v. Infocom Corp., No. 3:02-CR-052
(N.D. TX filed Dec. 17, 2002) (involving an ISP that allegedly provided material support to
terrorist groups by developing, hosting, and maintaining Web sites which incited violent
action against the U.S. and raised funds for terrorism-affiliated entities).
249 The Sami A1-Hussayen case is cited by some legal scholars as an example of the
misuse of the material support for terrorism statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000), to reach
First Amendment protected activities. See Robert Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terror-
ism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARv J. ON LEGIS. 1, 58 n.316
(2005) (emphasizing that online terrorist-related activity that falls short of the immi-
nence standard in Brandbenburg would enable the defendant to defeat the prosecution
on First Amendment grounds); Harvey Silvergate, Opinion, Free Speech in an Age of
Terror, BOSTON GLOBE June 28, 2004, at All (arguing that prosecution of Saudi stu-
dent Sami Omar AI-Hussayen raised free speech concerns); see also E-mail from Mi-
chael Froomkin, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, to Benjamin
R. Davis (Mar. 24, 2006, 21:38:45 EST) (on file with author).
250 See Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 137. The Connecticut federal
grand jury charged Ahmad with terrorism-related crimes, including running Web sites that
provided material support to the Taliban and the Chechen mujahideen by supplying "expert
advice and assistance, communications equipment, military items, lodging, training, false
documentation, transportation, funding, personnel and other support." Id.
251 Criminal Indictment, United States v. Ahmad, No. 3:04m240, at 1 (D. Conn. filed
July 28, 2004) [hereinafter Ahmad Criminal Indictment].
252 Altman, supra note 37.
253 Ahmad Criminal Indictment, supra note 251.
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,,254person is espousing. As Robert Altman emphasizes, "clearly the First
Amendment doesn't give you the right to cry fire in a crowded theater.,
255
However, defining speech protections in the context of cyber jihadists cre-
ates a difficult hurdle in their successful prosecution.
C. Pursuing ISP Accountability in the Civil Justice System
Suing ISPs for civil liability for failing to monitor and filter inappropriate
content is another avenue to clamp down on extremist content on the Inter-
net. Courts have generally conveyed strong hesitation in imposing negli-
gence liability on ISPs, except where it can be shown that ISPs were
aware, or should have been aware, of illegal activities taking place on sites
they host, or where it can be shown that a breach of duty caused damage to
a particular party.256 To date, almost all successful civil litigation alleging
ISP liability for content on hosted sites has involved copyright, trademark
infringement, or defamation claims.257 The lack of ISP content liability
litigation involving terrorism is due, in part, to statutory protections under
the Communications Decency Act,258 and the difficulty that victims of ter-
254 Altman, supra note 37.
255 id.
256 See Bolin & Daniel, supra note 49; Justin Nackley, "Oh What a Tangled [World
Wide] Web We Weave." The Dangers Facing Internet Service Providers, and Their Avail-
able Protections, 2005 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 2, 31-35 (2005) (describing a num-
ber of cases which found ISPs liable for content posted on Web sites which were hosted by
the defendant ISP).
257 See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assoc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (finding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not protect the defendant
ISP corporation from liability for copyright information for information posted on a
Web site by the company which was using the ISP services). But see Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a Web site host non-liable for sending out emails
sent to a listserve maintained by one of its sites under the Communications Decency Act
(CDA)); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[P]roviders of
interactive computer services .. .and their users [are immunaized] from causes of action
asserted by persons alleging harm caused by content provided by a third party."); Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, 206 F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 824 (2000) (declining to impose liability for the posting of incorrect stock data); Blu-
menthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-53 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding AOL not liable for
hosting the content of an independent contractor's news reports, despite a contract allowing
AOL to edit or remove content); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 830 (2002)
("immuniz[ing] providers of interactive computer services . .. and their users from causes
of action asserted by persons alleging harm caused by content provided by a third party");
Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal.App.4th 684, 692 (2001) (holding that the city
was immune under CDA Section 230 for a city library that allowed online access to
pornographic material); Doe v. Am. Online, 783 So.2d 1010, 1013-1017 (Fla. 2001), cert.
denied, 122 S.Ct. 208 (2000).
258 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2000). The Communications
Decency Act conveys Congress' interest in protecting speech on the Internet in that:
[Vol. 15
Ending the Cyber Jihad
rorism encounter in proving that a particular Web site or Internet posting
proximately caused a party's injury.259 Furthermore, monitoring Internet
traffic remains voluntary for providers and there are few criminal or civil
penalties for either ISPs or online criminal perpetrators under U.S. law.26
Without the threat of civil liability or affirmative statutory duties to track
and monitor Internet traffic and content on their hosted sites, it is unlikely
that providers or Internet-related technology companies will invest in de-
veloping the technology and personnel necessary to make the Internet a
more difficult place for cyber jihadists and other online criminals to oper-
ate.
26 1
V. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO CYBER JIHAD
Although many countries, particularly in Western Europe and North
America, have instituted policies strengthening penalties for cyber terrorist
attacks and providing additional resources for governments and private
organizations to monitor online activity,262 the fight against online Islamic
extremist activities remains an ad hoc endeavor.263 While national security
experts have praised the efforts of the international community in address-
ing the cyber terrorism threat,264 these observers fail to point out that the
actions multi-lateral bodies have taken to bolster Internet security focus
primarily on online copyright and trademark fraud, child pornography,
[I]t is the policy of the United States: (1) to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;(2) to pre-
serve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;(3) to en-
courage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what in-
formation is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services.
259 See Note, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Worm, 119 HARv L. REv. 2442, 2460 (2006) (citing Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner,
Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CYBERSECURITY 221, 221-58 (2006)).
260 The exception is where an ISP maintains editorial control over the content of the site,
or the ISP is repeatedly notified that a site is notorious for illicit content or traffic. In such
instances, civil and/or criminal penalties may be imposed. Gucci Am., Inc., 135 F. Supp.
2d, at 417.
261 See Molnar, supra note 47, at 26, 29-30.
262 See Johnson & Post, supra note 39.
263 See Legal Framework-Unauthorized Access to Computer Systems, supra note
40.
264 See Hinnen, supra note 105 (praising the efforts of the international community to
combat cyber-terrorism threats by pointing to the Council of Europe's adoption of the Con-
vention on Cybercrime and the G8 countries development of an integrated multi-national
cyber-terrorist threat monitoring and response unit).
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privacy issues, and offensive cyber attacks, while ignoring cyber jihad ac-
tivities.265
A. Multi-Lateral Treaties
The Council of Europe's Convention on Cyber Crime treaty ("Cyber
Crime treaty") is often cited as a success in terms of measurably improving
global Internet security.266 To date, forty-two countries, including the
United States in November 2001, have signed the Cyber Crime treaty.267
While the treaty did take significant steps to institutionalize mutual assis-
tance exchanges between signatory countries investigating computer-
related crime, it failed to address the threat of online terrorist planning ac-
tivity.268 The convention's provisions focus on cyber fraud, copyright vio-
lation, and child pornography issues.269 Moreover, the treaty illustrates the
shortcomings of multi-lateral regimes to respond quickly to emerging in-
ternational threats. As of September 2006, only thirteen countries had rati-
fied and integrated the convention into domestic laws.270 After years of
debate over privacy concerns regarding law enforcement investigative
powers in the treaty,27' the United States became the sixteenth country to
ratify the convention on August 3, 2006.272
The Group of Eight ("G8") leading industrialized nations has also ex-
panded international cooperation to combat computer crimes. 273 In 1996,
the G8 issued twenty-five measures to address new terrorist threats, devel-
oped by the G8's new Counter-Terrorism Experts Group, known as the
265 See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Jan. 1, 2006, ETS No. 185,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/1 85.htm.
266 See Hinnen, supra note 105, at 10; Rick Perera, Thirty Countries Sign Cybercrime
Treaty, IDG NEWS SERV., Nov. 23, 2001.
267 Senate Urged to Ratify Cybercrime Convention, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Dec. 13,
2005.
268 See Perera, supra note 266; Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 265.
269 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 265.
270 Convention on Cybercrime, Treaty Open for Signature,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=EN
G (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
271 David Quainton, Lobby Group Urges Ratification of Cybercrime Convention, SC
MAGAZINE, Jul. 1, 2005; Letter from Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) to
U.S. Sen. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Jul. 26, 2005)
(opposing Senate ratification of the treaty due to privacy concerns relating to the broad
investigative powers granted in the treaty).
272 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime art. 7-13, Nov. 23, 2001, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 108-11 (2006); Dan Kaplan, Senate Ratification of Cybercrime Treaty Praised,
SC MAGAZINE, Aug. 4, 2006; Declan McCullagh, Senate Ratifies Controversial Cybercrime
Treaty, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 4, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-7348_3-6102354.html.
273 G8 Presidency, http://www.g8.gov.uk/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
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Lyon Group.274 The recommendations were designed to combat transna-
tional terrorism and organized crime activities, including computer crime-
related activities, in G8 countries. 5 Within the Lyon Group, the G8 main-
tains a Subgroup on High-Tech Crime, which has "promulgated principles
and best practices regarding the prevention, investigation, and prosecution
of computer crimes." 276 The Subgroup also maintains a rapid response
team of computer crimes experts who are available 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week, "to respond to computer crime emergencies. 277
Unfortunately, the approaches taken by both the G8 and the Council of
Europe to fighting cyber crime and bolstering Internet security fail to en-
compass strategies against cyber jihad. The G8 has taken a passive en-
forcement approach, encouraging its member states to implement volun-
tary best practices for service providers and provider associations to retain
"identified categories of traffic data and/or subscriber data for legitimate
business or public safety purposes ... [and] ensure data protection legisla-
tion ... [allowing] retention and preservation of data important for net-
work security requirements or law enforcement investigations or prosecu-
tions ... ,278
In December 2005, the European Parliament took aggressive action in
addressing the need to equip intelligence and law enforcement authorities
with greater access to Internet data relating to cyber crime and cyber terror-
ism-related activities when it passed a directive to strengthen electronic
data retention laws in E.U. member states. 279 The directive requires E.U.
member states to implement national laws to retain electronic communica-
tions data for between six months and two years.280 The retention directive
covers a wide range of electronic data including Internet and e-mail user
identifications, Internet and landline telephone numbers dialed, IP ad-
dresses, as well as the date and time of log-ins and log-offs, and interna-
tional calling data for mobile cellular phone usage.28' While Internet and
telephone industry representatives were critical of the added burdens the
directive places on companies to comply with the new regulations, E.U.
274 G8 RECOMMENDATIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM, G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting
(2002).
275 id.
276 See Hinnen, supra note 105, at 25 n.85 (citing G8 Justice and Interior Ministers,
Recommendations for Tracing Networked Communications Across National Borders in
Terrorist and Criminal Investigations, http://justicecanada.ca/en/news/g8/doc2.html).
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Reten-
tion of Data Processed in Connection with the Provision of Electronic Communication
Services and Amending Directive, EUR. PARL. Doc. (CoM 438) (2005) [hereinafter Data
Retention Directive]; Jo Best, Europe Passes Tough New Data Retention Laws, CNET
NEWS.COM, Dec. 14, 2005, http://news.com.com/2100-7350_3-5995089.html.
280 Data Retention Directive, supra note 279, Parts V-VI.
281 Id. at art. 5(1).
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member states were careful to craft language that balances the civil liber-
ties and privacy interests of E.U. citizens with the need for greater access
to electronic data for security purposes. The directive explicitly includes
language that prohibits the storage of "data revealing the content of the
communication ... 282 While it is likely to take several years for E.U.
member states to develop and implement their own national laws to com-
ply with the directive,283 the E.U.'s action is unquestionably a significant
step in providing counterterrorism authorities the tools they need to prevent
and deter cyber jihadists from exploiting the Internet as an operational
theater.
B. The United Nations and the International Telecommunications Union
The U.N. has engaged the largest number of countries and private or-
ganizations in addressing the contemporary security challenges of the
Internet. The U.N. has even conveyed its concerns regarding the growing
cyber security threats in U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 57/239
(2003)284 and 58/199 (2004).285 Both resolutions promote the "creation of a
global culture of cyber security and the protection of critical information
infrastructure. 286
The U.N. has also taken a leadership role in examining significant legal
and policy issues related to the governance of the Internet. Many United
Nations member states also have inserted themselves into Internet govern-
ance issues via the U.N. subsidiary International Telecommunications Un-
ion ("ITU"). 287 Through the ITU, which is responsible for telecommunica-
tions regulatory and policy issues, the U.N. hosted two major international
282 Id. at art. 5(2).
283 Id. at art. 15(3) (allowing E.U. member states up to 36 months to comply with the
Internet, e-mail and Internet telephony provisions of the directive).
284 G.A. Res. 57/239, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/239 (Jan. 31, 2003).
285 G.A. Res. 58/199, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/199 (Jan. 30, 2004).
286 World Summit on the Information Society, Oct. 14, 2005, Hammamet Tunisia, WSIS
Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity: Outcome and Next Steps (prepared by Robert Shaw),
available at www.itu.int/osg/spu/presentations/2005/shaw-cybersecurity-gsr-14-nov-05.pdf
[hereinafter WSIS Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity].
287 International Telecommunications Union,
http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/overview/purposes.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2006). According
to its Web site, the ITU:
[w]as established last century as an impartial, international organization within which
governments and the private sector could work together to coordinate the operation of
telecommunication networks and services and advance the development of communi-
cations technology. Whilst the organization remains relatively unknown to the general
public, ITU's work over more than one hundred years has helped create a global com-
munications network which now integrates a huge range of technologies, yet remains
one of the most reliable man-made systems ever developed.
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conferences in 2003288 and 2005289 on transnational issues related to the
durability, accessibility, and security of the Internet.290 However, despite
the pervasive attention in the world media to the growing threat of online
terrorism-related activities, the U.N. has not specifically addressed the
threat posed by terrorists' exploitation of the Internet for operational and
planning purposes.
At the World Summit on the Information Society II in Tunis, Tunisia in
December 2005,291 for example, the agenda focused on expanding Internet
access and information technology infrastructure to the developing world.
The Summit's only reference to terrorism-related activity on the Internet
was a statement of principle on the importance of countering terrorism on
the Internet, buried as point 44 in the summit's 121 point agenda.
92
288 Id. World Summit on the Information Society, First Phase, Dec. 10-12, 2003,
http://www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/index.html. The first World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS):
[T]ook place in Geneva hosted by the Government of Switzerland from 10 to 12 De-
cember 2003. The objective of the first phase was to develop and foster a clear state-
ment of political will and take concrete steps to establish the foundations for an Infor-
mation Society for all, reflecting all the different interests at stake. At the Geneva
Phase of WSIS nearly 50 Heads of state/government and Vice-Presidents, 82 Minis-
ters, and 26 Vice-Ministers and Heads of delegation as well as high-level representa-
tives from international organizations, private sector, and civil society provided politi-
cal support to the WSIS Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action that were
adopted on 12 December 2003. More than 11,000 participants from 175 countries at-
tended the Summit and related events.
Id.
289 World Summit on the Information Society, Second Phase, Nov. 16-18, 2005,
http://www.itu.int/wsis/tunis/index.html [hereinafter Tunis Summit].
290 The Tunis Summit participating states issued a proclamation which describes the
agenda of ITU regarding Internet governance in the years to come. The Summit agreed that:
We recognize that Internet governance, carried out according to the Geneva principles,
is an essential element for a people-centred, inclusive, development-oriented and non-
discriminatory Information Society. Furthermore, we commit ourselves to the stability
and security of the Internet as a global facility and to ensuring the requisite legitimacy
of its governance, based on the full participation of all stakeholders, from both devel-
oped and developing countries, within their respective roles and responsibilities.
World Summit On The Information Society, Tunis Agenda For The Information Society,
31, WSIS 05Tunis/Doc/6(Rev.1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Tunis Agenda For The
Information Society].
291 The Tunis Summit was one of the largest gatherings ever held regarding policy issues
relating to the Internet. It was attended by over 19,000 participants, senior officials from
174 countries, as well as 800 entities including UN agencies, private businesses, and civil
society organizations. World Summit on the Information Society, Summit Newsroom-
Tunis Phase, http://www.itu.int/wsis/tunis/newsroom/index.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2006).
292 Tunis Summit, supra note 289. The inclusion of the terrorism-related language in the
Statement of Principles was inserted at the last minute by conference participants reportedly
due to the persistent urging of the Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom; see ITIC, Mar-
keting of Terrorism on the Internet, http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng-n/tunise.htm
(last visited Aug. 26, 2006). The summit's pronouncement on combating cyber terrorism
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Like the U.S. government, the ITU remains overly focused on imple-
menting enforcement and prosecution strategies. In laying out a public
policy framework of agreed upon principles for responding to cyber secu-
rity threats, the ITU Tunis Conference participants emphasized interna-
tional cooperation in investigating and prosecuting cyber crimes.293 Instead,
the summit participants could have used the opportunity to explore meth-
ods of prevention and interdiction of emerging and expanding cyber ji-
hadist operations.294
Much of the substantive agenda at the Tunis Conference was overshad-
owed by the ongoing controversy regarding which organization or gov-
ernment(s) would control the administration and governance of the Inter-
net. 295 During the conference, a number of participating states, including
Brazil, Iran, China, Venezuela, Sudan, and the European Union, acting on
fears that ICANN operates as a puppet of the U.S. government, sought to
limit the powers and influence of ICANN. 296 This anti-ICANN coalition
advocated for bolstering the clout and responsibilities of other multina-
tional organizations, such as the ITU, which historically have been in-
volved on the periphery of Internet policy-making issues, without the abil-
ity to wield any administrative or regulatory control.297
U.N. member states reached a compromise in late 2005, agreeing that
"an international forum under U.N. auspices, will be set up to examine
stated: "We also underline the importance of countering terrorism in all its forms and mani-
festations on the Internet, while respecting human rights and in compliance with other obli-
gations under international law .... Id.
293 Tunis Summit, supra note 289.
294 The Tunis Summit stakeholders agreed in principle that:
We seek to build confidence and security in the use of ICTs by strengthening the trust
framework. We reaffirm the necessity to further promote, develop and implement in
cooperation with all stakeholders a global culture of cyber security, as outlined in
UNGA Resolution 57/239 and other relevant regional frameworks. This culture re-
quires national action and increased international cooperation to strengthen security
while enhancing the protection of personal information, privacy and data. Continued
development of the culture of cyber security should enhance access and trade and must
take into account the level of social and economic development of each country and
respect the development-oriented aspects of the .... We underline the importance of
the prosecution of cybercrime, including cybercrime committed in one jurisdiction but
having effects in another. We further underline the necessity of effective and efficient
tools and actions, at national and international levels, to promote international coop-
eration among, inter alia, law enforcement agencies on cybercrime. We call upon gov-
ernments in cooperation with other stakeholders to develop necessary legislation for
the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime, noting existing frameworks ....
Tunis Agenda For The Information Society, supra note 290, at In 39-40.
295 Rupert Cornwell, US Wins Right to Keep Internet Control after Warning of Censor-
ship, FINAN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005.
296 Tunis Summit, supra note 289.
297 Id.; Bob Keefe, Tug of War for Internet Goes Global, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 16,
2005, at Al; Ben Tanner, U.S. Retains Domain Name Control, DM ASIA, Nov. 17, 2005,
available at http://www.digitalmediaasia.com/default.asp?ArticlelD= 11342.
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Internet issues. But day-to-day management of the Internet will remain
with the California-based ICANN.,, 298 Fortunately, the resolution of this
controversy over the regulatory control of the Internet should permit poli-
cymakers and Internet governance experts to turn their attention and re-
sources to significant administrative and governance challenges facing
ICANN, including the rising threat of cyberjihad operations.
C. Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN")
In order to better understand the options for confronting the cyber jihad,
it is important to examine the regulatory and administrative characteristics
of ICANN, the primary organization responsible for governing the Inter-
net.299 Since 1998, when the U.S. government privatized it, the Internet has
technically been governed by ICANN, a not-for-profit California-based
corporation. 3°°
The mission of ICANN is "to create an effective private sector policy
development process capable of administrative and policy management of
the Internet's naming and address systems." '' ICANN, according to its
mission, is intended to serve as a "more effective-more nimble... alter-
native to the traditional, pre-Internet model of a multinational government
treaty organization. '30 2 According to ICANN's official bylaws, the organi-
zation's core values include the responsibility for "preserving and enhanc-
ing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability
of the Internet.
30 3
The ICANN Web site indicates that the organization is responsible for:
298 Cornwell, supra note 295.
299 ICANN, http://www.icann.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
300 Milton Mueller, ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting through the debris of 'self-
regulation,' 1 J. OF POL'Y REG. & STRAT. FOR TELECOMM. INFO. AND MEDIA 497,498 (1999)
(providing a history of the development of the ICANN organization).
30 ICANN, ICANN President's Report, The Case for Reform, Feb. 24 2002,
http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-proposal-24feb02.htm.
302 Id. Ironically, the focus on private control of the Internet resulted from the interven-
tion of the Clinton Administration's Commerce Department in the debate surrounding the
governance at a crucial time in the mid-1990s when the Internet was experiencing explosive
growth and innovation. At a U.S. Congressional hearing on governance of the Internet,
Larry Irving, then Assistant Secretary of Commerce and whose responsibilities included
overseeing the administration of the Internet, told Congress that "[tihe private sector, with
input from governments, should develop stable, consensus-based self-governing mecha-
nisms for domain name registration and management that adequately defines responsibili-
ties and maintains accountability." Internet Domain Names Part I: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Sci., Subcomm. on Basic Research, 105th Cong. 4 (1997) (statement of Larry
Irving, Asst. Sec. of Commerce for Commc'n and Info.). Irving also emphasized that "self
governance mechanisms should recognize the inherently global nature of the Internet." Id.
303 ICANN, Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm#I (last visited Oct. 30 2006).
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[m]anaging and coordinating the Domain Name System (DNS) to ensure that ever ad-
dress is unique and that all users of the Internet can find all valid addresses. It does this
by overseeing the distribution of unique IP addresses and domain names. It also en-
sures that each domain name maps to the correct IP address. ICANN is also responsi-
ble for accrediting the domain name registrars. "Accredit" means to identify and set
minimum standards for the performance of registration functions, to recognize persons
or entities meeting those standards, and to enter into an accreditation agreement that




As such, ICANN's regulatory authority over the DNS system "provides
the control point from which to regulate users. '305 Because of its central-
ized control over the DNS system, Klein emphasizes that "ICANN realizes
the governance potential in DNS, [by] leveraging Internet addressing to
achieve global governance., 30 6 In fact, Klein suggests that ICANN is ap-
propriately equipped to handle a wide array of regulatory challenges, in-
cluding security-related initiatives.
At its core, ICANN is partially responsible for operating the thirteen root
servers, ten of which are located in the United States, which drive the
Internet.3 °7 In addition, ICANN governs the hosting and distribution of
domain names through a "web of top-down contracts" 30 8 that specify the
terms of the registrar or domain name holder contracts.309
According the Hans Klein, ICANN has taken on the following array of
administrative and policy-making functions:
ICANN defined and enforced new forms of intellectual property in Internet domain
names, it regulated market entry and set prices in relevant industries, and it possessed
(but did not immediately exercise) the awesome power to disconnect entire country
domains from the Internet. With widespread recognition of its policy role came grow-
ing calls for a restructuring of ICANN to endow it with a degree of legitimacy appro-
priate to its powers.
3 1
0
304 ICANN, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.icann.org/faq (last visited Oct. 30,
2006).
305 Hans Klein, ICANN and Internet Governance: Leveraging Technical Coordination to
Realize Global Public Policy, 18 INF. Soc'Y 193, 195 (2002).
306 Id. at 201.
307 Wolfgang Kleinwoechter, From Self-Governance to Public-Private Partnership: The
Changing Role of Governments in the Management of the Internet's Core Resources, 36
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1103, 1123 (2003).
308 See, Jonathan Weinberg, Backgrounder: ICANN and Internet Governance (adapted
from JONATHAN WEINBERG, INTERNET GoVERNANcE, TRANSNAT'L CYBERSPACE L. (2000)),
http://www.law.wayne.edu/weinberg/mdrbackgrounder.pdf.
"ICANN's power over domain name registration (and through it, possibly other
aspects of Internet activity) ultimately derives from its ability to maintain the obedience of
operators of top-level domain name root servers, which sit on top of a pyramid of servers
that record and track Internet domain names ... [and] enable Internet users to find and get
access to Web sites or to send e-mail."
Id.
310 HANS KLEIN, Soc. Sc1. RES. CONS. INFO. TECH. & INT'L COOPERATION PROGRAM,
RESPONSE PAPER 3: LEGrrIMACY AND GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2004), available at
www.ssrc.org/programs/itic/publications/knowledge-report/memos/kleinmemo3 .pdf.
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Despite ICANN's effectiveness in some administration areas, a number
of experts argue that it is impossible for ICANN "to be all things to all
people-simultaneously private and public, international and local, poli-
cymaking and a mere facilitator of technical management. ' '31 Critics ques-
tion the efficacy of preserving the ICANN organization as the preeminent
Internet governance organizations given its broad-ranging responsibilities,
limited resources, and lingering ties to the U.S. government.312
In order to overcome hurdles to gaining more institutional legitimacy,
ICANN must explicitly delineate the role of governments and other or-
ganizations in its regulatory process. Since 2002, the role of national gov-
ernments in the administration and development of ICANN has been
strengthened. ICANN struggled in its first few years to overcome a legiti-
macy gap; this was due in large part to its limited funding and lack of co-
operation from governments that participated on ICANN's Government
Advisory Committee.
Recently, ICANN regulators have taken note of rising threats to the "sta-
bility" and "security" of the Internet posed by the growing number of cyber
jihadists and online criminals. Due in part to reform pressures from Inter-
net governance experts and national governments, ICANN has begun to
address the issues of prevention and accessibility. For example, ICANN
established a Security and Advisory Committee ("SAC") tasked with
tracking and resolving security threats to the naming and address system of
the Internet.3"3 Unfortunately, the SAC's purview does not specifically
311 Weinberg, supra note 308, at 1.
312 See Michael Froomkin, ICANN 2.0: Meet the New Boss, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1087,
1092, 1101 (2003); Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route
Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DuKE L.J. 17, 18-22 (2000); see also ICANN
Watch, http://www.icannwatch.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
313 See ICANN Security Committee Charter,
http://www.icann.org/committees/security/charter-14marO2.htm (last visited Aug. 27,
2006). The bylaws lay out the following responsibilities for the Special Advisory Commit-
tee:
(1) To develop a security framework for Internet naming and address allocation ser-
vices that defines the key focus areas, and identifies where the responsibilities for each
area lie. The committee will focus on the operational considerations of critical naming
infrastructure; (2) To communicate on security matters with the Internet technical
community and the operators and managers of critical DNS infrastructure services, to
include the root name server operator community, the top-level domain registries and
registrars, the operators of the reverse delegation trees such as in-addr.arpa and
ip6.arpa, and others as events and developments dictate. The Committee will gather
and articulate requirements to offer to those engaged in technical revision of the proto-
cols related to DNS and address allocation and those engaged in operations planning;
(3) To engage in ongoing threat assessment and risk analysis of the Internet naming
and address allocation services to assess where the principal threats to stability and se-
curity lie, and to advise the ICANN community accordingly. The Committee will rec-
ommend any necessary audit activity to assess the current status of DNS and address
allocation security in relation to identified risks and threats.
2006]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
include security initiatives relating to cyber jihadists and other online
criminals, which would empower ICANN to address cyber terrorism-
related issues.
In 2005 and 2006, ICANN also sponsored a reform taskforce to examine
systemic problems in the Whols Web site address verification system.3"'
The investigation uncovered the persistent failure of ICANN and its local
providers to require accurate recording of site holders' identifier informa-
tion on the Whols site, as well as the pervasive misrepresentations of in-
formation posted by Whols registrants.31 5 Such issues in the Whols data-
base can critically hinder investigative efforts to pursue cyber wrongdoers.
In order to successfully pursue a reform agenda, ICANN must further so-
lidify its role as the primary regulator and administrator of the Internet.
Noted Internet governance experts have recommended a multi-faceted ap-
proach to reform that would broadly enhance the ability of ICANN to carry
out its mission, while retaining it as the primary organization for regulation
of the Internet.3 16 In a paper prepared for the World Summit on the Infor-
mation Society in November 2005, Professor Klein recommended action to
enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of ICANN:
Political Authorization: A legitimate political authority (presumably an international
body) should formalize the delegation of regulatory powers to ICANN; Legislative
Mandate: That same political authority should spell out and delimit ICANN's mandate.
This should be codified in an international legal instrument; Internal Processes:
ICANN's system of stakeholder representation and decision-making should be re-
viewed for fairness and efficiency. Internal procedures should be clearly specified in a
legal instrument, most likely its corporate charter and bylaws; Judicial Review:
Mechanisms should be created by which ICANN's regulatory decisions can be ap-
pealed to higher authority. Any appellate body should have the power to enforce its
decisions; and Political Oversight: The legitimate political authority described above
should periodically review ICANN's actions and mandate. Political oversight should
itself be highly constrained in order to insulate ICANN from political pressures.
317
314 "The purpose of Whols is to provide to third parties an accurate and authoritative link
between a domain name and a responsible party who can either act to resolve, or reliably
pass information to those who can resolve, technical problems associated with or caused by
the domain." PRELIMINARY TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE PURPOSE OF WHOIS AND OF THE
WHOIS CONTACTS, WHOIS TASK FORCE, GENERIC NAMES SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION,
ICANN (2006), http://gnso.icann.org/issues/whois-privacy/prelim-tf-rpt-18jan06.pdf. In its
preliminary taskforce report, ICANN notes that the taskforce was formed in an effort to
fulfill its obligations in protecting the core values of the Internet including the security and
stability of the Internet. Id.
315 Id.
316 See generally HANS KLEIN, ICANN REFORM: ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW,
INTERNET & PUBLIC POLICY PROJECT (2005) [hereinafter ICANN REFORM: ESTABLISHING
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Professor Klein's recommendations provide a substantial foundation
from which ICANN can build an effective organization that is empowered
to address the long-term cyber jihad threat.
VI. PRINCIPLES FOR A CYBER VICTORY
While Internet governance stakeholders continue to debate the character-
istics of an emerging Internet governance regime, experts have failed to
keep up with the ever-intensifying threats facing the Internet. While many
experts have focused their energies and analysis on macro-level issues,
such as forming sustainable Internet governance institutions, serious atten-
tion to a number of vital Internet security issues has been lacking in the
Internet governance literature. Without greater debate and innovative pol-
icy responses to these challenges, the visionaries of the Internet will be
prevented from creating an "enduring global architecture" of innovation,
security, and sustainability on the Internet. 18 To fill some of the gaps in the
literature on the cyber jihad, it is important to identify, describe, and evalu-
ate a number of principles and tactics central to mitigating the threat posed
by cyber jihadist activities.
Five core mutually-reinforcing principles based on Professor Klein's
ICANN reform recommendations should guide Internet policymakers in
addressing the cyber jihad threat and formulating strategic responses: au-
thority and legitimacy; enforcement and normalization; verifiability; flexi-
bility; and balance of security and liberty interests. 319
A. Authority and Legitimacy
In order to take aggressive action against the cyber j ihad, ICANN needs
to gain the legitimate authority to debate, develop, and implement bold
new policies.320 The Internet governing body needs cooperation from an
array of public and private stakeholders who will continue to be involved
in the Internet policy-making process. 32' Legitimacy must be viewed within
the context of power and authority.322 As Professor Klein argues, "[p]ower
is the ability to realize one's intentions .... Relative to public policy, [le-
gitimacy] usually refers to the exercise of power over societal entities,
[such as] people, organizations, or nation-states. Authority is power en-
318 WSIS Thematic Meeting on Cybersecurity, supra note 286.
319 See ICANN REFORM: ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 316; supra accom-
panying text Part IV.A.
320 Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 22-24 (2005).
321 See ICANN REFORM: ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 316.
322 Id. at 2.
2006]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
dowed with legitimacy. 323 Without this requisite legitimacy, ICANN be-
came bogged down in battles over process and control that fundamentally
limited the organization's ability to implement its vision for the future of
the Internet. 324 Now that Internet regulatory stakeholders have resolved the
major dispute regarding ICANN's administrative control of the Internet at
the Tunis Conference in late 2005,325 ICANN should be able to develop
and preserve its institutional legitimacy in asserting full administrative and
regulatory enforcement control over the Internet.
B. Enforcement and Normalization
The Internet community's "strongest method of enforcement is expul-
sion. 3 26 To date, true normalization of Internet activity by expelling bad
actors has been all but abandoned by Internet policymakers on the national
and international organization levels. The existing rules, regulations, laws,
and contracts related to online terrorism-related activities are insufficient
and rarely, if ever, enforced.3 27 As a result, normalization of the Internet
further erodes while criminals and terrorists continue to push the envelope
of illicit online activities.32 Until more stringent enforcement of Internet
regulations is achieved, greater security against cyber jihadist threats will
be unobtainable.
Once ICANN is truly granted the authority to develop and implement ef-
fective policies, it will be able to enact and enforce aggressive and innova-
tive Internet security measures. The organization's ability to enforce laws
and rules will lead to the normalization of Internet activities and the exclu-
sion of nefarious elements, such as cyber jihadists, from the Internet. Once
ICANN's ability to regulate and normalize the scope of permissible activi-
ties on the Internet increases, clearer legal and ethical standards of conduct
in cyberspacewill emerge. Standardization of behavioral norms throughout
the Internet community will increasingly support ICANN in the expulsion
of rogue users from that community so that "there is no longer any place
[for cyber j ihadists] to run to anymore, in which case enforcement, at least
in theory, has attained its outer limit.
329
323 Hans Klein, Working with the Resources at Hand: Constraints on Internet Institu-
tional Design, 9 J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUD. 403,404 (2004).
324 See infra Part IV (describing the ongoing disputes between ICANN and its stake-
holders for administrative and regulatory control over the Internet).
325 See generally Tunis Summit, supra note 289.
326 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of Governance: Analyzing the World of Inter-
net Regulation, 43 VA. J. INT'L. L. 605, 633 (2003).
327 id.
328 See Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 212-13 (1997).
329 Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 326, at 634.
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C. Verifiability
Legitimate authority empowering decision-makers to produce sound and
enforceable policy in a normalized Internet community is rooted in accu-
rate and verifiable information about the individuals and organizations
which constitute the users and ISPs. 330 A major difficulty in investigating
and enforcing the rules of the Internet is verifying the registration informa-
tion provided at Internet entry points, such as ISPs or registrar sites. 3 ' Al-
though this information is explicitly required by ICANN rules, the en-
forcement of the rules to date has been lax.332 As a result, law enforcement
has no quick, reliable way of identifying parties responsible for Web
sites.333 The failure to ensure accurate and verifiable registration informa-
tion undermines the legitimate authority of the entire Internet regulatory
regime to investigate illicit uses of the Internet and to impose penalties.
D. Flexibility
In order to implement enforceable security policies aimed at eliminating
the cyber jihad threat, ICANN must improve responsiveness to the rapidly-
emerging innovations and challenges of the Internet. In order to attain the
delicate mixture of legitimacy through verifiability, normalization, and
flexibility, Internet policymakers need to approach solving the Internet
security problems with balance, effectively weighing the needs and inter-
ests of the multitude of existing and future Internet stakeholders.
330 Molnar, supra note 47, at 29-45.
131 Id. at 30.
332 See ICANN, WHOIs RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECURITY AND STABILITY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (2003), available at www.icann.org/committees/security/whois-
recommendation-OldecO2.pdf.
333 See id. The report explains that:
[T]he accuracy of Whois data used to provide contact information for the party re-
sponsible for an Internet resource must be improved, both at the time of its initial reg-
istration and at regular intervals. Whois records known to be false or inaccurate must
be frozen or held until they can be updated or removed. Whois records that have in-
formation that can not be validated may be frozen or held until it can be verified...
There are two principal reasons to maintain accurate contact information in Whois re-
cords: technical and legal. The technical rationale is that if there are problems with or
abuse originating from a resource (e.g., a domain name, route, or IP address) the
Whois entry for the resource is the only source for finding the responsible party. For




E. Balancing Security and Liberty
Balancing the needs of regulation and security with the Internet's driving
forces of innovation and the free flow of information is one of the great
policy challenges of our time. However, "a regulation need not be abso-
lutely effective to be sufficiently effective. It need not raise the cost of the
prohibited activity to infinity in order to reduce the level of that activity
quite substantially." '334 Thus, a balance should be sought in which the risks
and costs of illicit behavior are dramatically reduced without impinging
upon the freedom to conduct legal and beneficial activities on the Inter-
net.
335
VII. NEW TOOLS FOR WINNING THE WAR AGAINST THE CYBER
JIHAD
As Internet policymakers and vested stakeholders take aim at combating
the cyber jihad, key policy thinkers and decision-makers must develop a
new set of regulatory tools and tactics that incorporate the principles out-
lined above. Not all of the following tactical recommendations for combat-
ing cyber jihadism are entirely new concepts or ideas to Internet regulators.
But by adopting, implementing, and enforcing these policy and legal in-
struments, Internet regulators will begin to build a sustainable and endur-
ing Internet governance architecture for future generations.
There are seven core legal and tactical tools which ICANN policymakers
and other regulators should consider and implement in combating cyber
jihadism: (1) identify and explicitly define what activities on the Internet
are prohibited and punishable by ICANN; (2) require greater Internet regis-
tration disclosure and verification requirements akin to a user identification
number for the Internet; (3) require ISPs and other providers to store user
traffic data on a rolling basis for ten day intervals; (4) establish a central-
ized monitoring and enforcement section at ICANN to track illicit Internet
activities; (5) create an Internet sanctions blacklist of banned users, provid-
ers and computers which are associated with illicit online criminal activity;
(6) impose civil negligence fines and liability for providers who fail to
monitor and enforce content restrictions; (7) develop and sustain sufficient
334 Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1405 (1996).
Professor Lessig argues that:
[Ilf regulation increases the cost of access to this kind of information, it will reduce
access to this information, even if it doesn't reduce it to zero... If government regula-
tion had to show that it was perfect before it was justified, then indeed there would be
little regulation of cyberspace, or of real space either. But regulation, whether for the
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public and private funding and technology sources for building and pro-
tecting the Internet of the future.
A. Establish Universal Standards for Illicit Internet Activities
Any effort to improve the security and oversight of the Internet must be-
gin with the collaboration of Internet regulators, mainly ICANN and the
ITU, to develop common, universal definitions of prohibited online activi-
ties.336 To date, neither the 1TU nor ICANN have developed clear, accessi-
ble standards for prohibited Internet activities.337 ICANN has deferred the
standardization of Internet activities to local ISPs, who generally include in
customer contracts language about permissible and prohibited Internet ac-
tivities. 38 However, the issuance and enforcement of these standards pri-
336 Now that the international community has reached a compromise agreement on the
administrative control over the Internet and has preserved ICANN's administrative author-
ity over the Internet, it should be more feasible for ICANN and ITU to build consensus on
matters of substantive importance, as there is no longer a larger conflict regarding overall
control of the Internet. Yet, substantial antipathy remains between the ITU and ICANN
which must be overcome before substantive cooperation can take place. Id. But see E-mail
from Michael Froomkin, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Benjamin
R. Davis (Mar. 24, 2006, 21:38:45 EST) (on file with author). Professor Froomkin re-
sponded to the suggestion that ITU and ICANN will cooperate on policy reforms as a "pipe
dream.., seeing as they hate and fear each other." Id.
337 See Amended Bylaws for Internet Corporate for Assigned Names and Numbers (Apr.
8, 2005); World Summit on the Info. Soc, Geneva, Switzerland, Dec. 12, 2003, Declaration
of Principles: Building the Info. Soc.: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium, Int'l
Telecomm. Union, WSIS-03/Geneva/Doc/4-E, 1 44, available at
http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html (under "WSIS Outcome Documents," select "Geneva
Declaration of Principles" hyperlink, then select document according to preferred language
and format); Golden Book: Stakeholder Commitments And Initiatives, Second World Sum-
mit On The Info. Soc., International Telecomm. Union, Tunis, Tunisia, Feb. 24, 2006.
338 See Yahoo Terms of Service, 6 Member Conduct,
http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/info/terms.html. The Yahoo Terms of Service stipulate that the
user agrees:
Yahoo may access, preserve, and disclose your account information and Content: (a)
to its affiliated companies worldwide for the purpose of providing the Content to you
in an efficient manner; (b) for the purpose of properly administering your account in
accordance with the standard operating procedures of Yahoo or its affiliated compa-
nies; and (c) if required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that any such access,
preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to: (i) comply with legal process;
(ii) enforce the TOS; (iii) respond to claims that any Content violates the rights of
third-parties; (iv) respond to your requests for customer service; or (v) protect the
rights, property, or personal safety of Yahoo, its users and the public.
Id.; see also Molnar, supra note 47, at 26 (noting how registrars do not conduct any back-
ground checks, nor assumed any responsibility or liability due to customer's registration
containing false or improper contact information despite being specifically required by
ICANN accreditation rules to assure accurate registrant information); ICANN Registrar




marily have been undertaken by providers on a voluntary basis. 3 9 As a
result, providers and Internet users have had virtually no incentive to com-
ply with any existing contractual obligations regarding user conduct, hav-
ing faced practically no repercussions for noncompliance.
34
0
1. Define Prohibited Internet Activities
ICANN must work with its stakeholders to implement a standardized and
legally-binding definition of prohibited Internet practices that can be refer-
enced by both providers and users. In developing standardized language
with public and private stakeholders, ICANN should assert its legitimate
regulatory authority and articulate these standards for adoption by the legal
systems of individual countries. The standardization of regulatory authority
on the international level would enable more effective investigation and
prosecution of Internet crimes and end the balkanization of national Inter-
net regulations.
Key definitional language could address: activity related to the planning
or coordination of a violent act; 34 1 "crimes against persons and related ex-
tortion that are of international significance; ' '342 and support, solicitation, or
provision of any and all types of assistance to U.N. 1267 Committee-listed
terrorist individuals, groups, or affiliated entities.343
2. Establish Universal Internet User and Provider Contracts
The legal legitimacy and binding nature of these standards should be fur-
ther enhanced by including the language in universally-recognized user
contracts drafted and distributed by ICANN.344 These contracts could be
distributed for use by Web site hosts as well as service providers and us-
ers.345 While the suggested language would certainly require subsequent
additions and amendments, it is vital that the Internet regulators establish a
common regulatory baseline. Most importantly, by establishing explicit
definitions for prohibited Internet activities that are binding on all Internet
providers and users, Internet regulators around the world would have the
ability to hold complicit parties accountable for non-compliance with
ICANN security regulations.
339 See Molnar, supra note 47.
34 id.
341 See generally Thomas, supra note 25.
342 Organization of American States Convention on Terrorism, Convention to Prevent
and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related
Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, O.A.S.T.S. No. 24,381.
343 S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 3.
344 See Nackley, supra note 256, at 22-24 (proposing the introduction and distribution of
a uniform registrar and ISP contract).
34' Id. at 12.
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B. Surfing with Our Eyes Wide Open: Increasing Registration Disclosure
In order to reverse intensifying cyber lawlessness, regulators must estab-
lish, implement, and enforce realistic registration disclosure and verifica-
tion mechanisms to reveal the true personal identity or organizational af-
filiation of an Internet user. While ICANN has addressed a number of the
problems with its cyber registration regime through the ongoing Taskforce
on the Purpose of Whols and of the Whols Contacts, 346 the organization
must be more responsive to the registration concerns in the Internet com-
munity.
1. Establish a Universal Internet User Identification Program
To enhance the ability of providers and investigative authorities to iden-
tify cyber jihadists, ICANN regulators could create an Internet user ID
system that requires a unique identification number for each individual
upon completion of a brief registration process by an applicant. A prospec-
tive or existing Internet user could be required to electronically submit
copies of some form of unique identifier information or two forms of photo
identification to ICANN which would then process the request electroni-
cally. The user would then be provided with a unique log-on credential,
which would enable the user to sign-on to the Internet with minimal delay
or hassle, while greatly enhancing the ability of monitors and enforcement
authorities to identify particular illicit online users. The only change from
the present Internet environment would be that the illicit user's activities
would then be traceable wherever that individual chose to visit online-
whether a user visited a terrorist Web site, a jihadist chat room, or a com-
pany's hijacked Web site that contains terrorist training and operational
materials.347 The program would permit ISPs and investigators to reference
another layer of identification information, in addition to the user's IP ad-
346 ICANN, PRELIMINARY TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE PURPOSE OF WHOIS AND OF THE
WHOIS CONTACT (2006), available at http://gnso.icann.org/issues/whois-privacy/prelim-tf-
rpt- 18jan06.htm.
347 An earlier proposal by ICANN's Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO)
presents a slightly different remedy for the online registration crisis in proposing a registra-
tion site with tiered levels of access. The tiered information system would enable registrars
and ISPs to access additional registration data on a registered user while protecting a user's
privacy interests against data and identity theft. ICANN, ICANN GENERIC NAMES SUPPORT-
ING ORGANIZATION COUNCIL, TASK FORCE 3, IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF DATA COLLECTED
FROM GTLD REGISTRANTS PRELIMINARY REPORT 6 (2004) available at
http://gnso.icann.org/issues/whois-privacyrF3PreliminaryWithRCMRl.pdf. Critics of a
user ID would likely argue that the user ID could easily be forged and would fail to bolster
transparency on the Internet. Id. at 8. Requiring multiple forms of photographic identifica-
tion is designed to make document forgery more difficult.
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dress, and would likely expedite investigator's ability to pinpoint the indi-
vidual's online operating location.348
A user ID system would not completely guard against fraud and misrep-
resentation; thousands of users would undoubtedly continue to find ways to
falsify their identification information. But a user ID system would in-
crease the challenges and risks for illicit users of the Internet while simul-
taneously adding to the virtual "paper trail. 3 49 Additional identification
information made available to providers and investigative authorities could
present a substantial deterrent to many existing illicit Internet users who
would no longer be able to hide behind public Internet portals at cyber
cafes or libraries.35 °
2. Need for Outside Support for Database of User Identifications
Implementing a user ID system could require ICANN, ISPs, and soft-
ware developers to collaborate in developing a universal sign-on page to
the Internet where the user would simply enter his ID number. An ID sys-
tem would also require that governments signal their support for the initia-
tive and possibly provide partial funding for the development of the requi-
site software and database technologies. The success of this and other secu-
rity reform proposals will rely to a great extent on the ability of ICANN to
solidify government and private industry support for the initiative.
To appease critics concerned about the civil liberty concerns associated
with requirements for a user ID, the user identification number would not
disclose the user's identity to anyone but the ISP and the centralized Inter-
net regulatory body-most likely ICANN. Therefore, the disclosure of the
information would pose little risk to users who feared that the information
could be exploited by identity thieves or other online predators.
In addition, many Internet users are already required to disclose personal
information in order to establish access accounts with providers. Users are
often required to consent to limited disclosure of their online activities to
affiliated ISPs and e-mail providers. In everyday life, individuals are re-
quired to possess identification to conduct numerous mundane activities
such as driving a car, checking their bank account balances, and entering
their places of work.35' It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suggest that
348 Id.
349 See Lessig, supra note 334, at 1405.
350 See supra Part I (describing how September 11 th hijacker and plot ringleader Mo-
hammed Atta was observed by multiple witnesses using the Internet at computer terminals
in public libraries in south Florida in the weeks prior to the September 11 th attacks).
351 See Scorr LEDERER ET AL., MANAGING PERSONAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN
UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS (2003), available at
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edulPubs/TechRpts/2003/CSD-03-1257.pdf. This article argues
that: "the emergence of a global heterogeneous real-time database composed of people,
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users be required to disclose a unique identifying number in order to allow
Internet regulators to track the user's activities should the need for an in-
vestigation be triggered.
C. Require ISPs and Other Providers to Store User Traffic Data for a
Longer Period
Although the U.S. domestic ISP industry has signaled that it is open to
assuming greater responsibilities in Internet monitoring, 352 particularly
relating to cyber pornography issues, there has been little legal action out-
side of Europe to enhance the duties of ISPs to track and store content and
activity records of individual Internet users.353 The laws that have been
implemented are watered down to the point of being ineffectual. For in-
stance, the PATRIOT Act focuses on providing liability immunity for pro-
viders should they voluntarily choose to monitor the activity of suspected
illicit users and voluntarily disclose this information to law enforcement
officials. 354 These and other policy reforms subsequent to September 11 th
have been enforcement-focused, rather than prevention-oriented measures.
ICANN and its stakeholders must develop and implement access preven-
tion measures which enable providers and regulators to quickly identify
and track users who perpetrate online jihad activities.
While many policymakers and Internet industry stakeholders have pub-
licly opposed any proposals requiring ISPs to store user data for any sub-
stantial period of time due to cost and privacy concerns, 3 5  a number of
providers have already implemented aggressive user tracking and data
storage technologies. For example, AOL has maintained a program for
years that closely monitors the activities of its account holders. Once a
violation has been identified and the user information is verified, AOL
contacts the user and places the user on notice regarding the prohibited
nature of the conduct in question.356 After a predetermined number of vio-
lations, the account is closed and the user is barred from establishing a new
AOL account. There is little reason to believe that similar types of user
places, and things instead of records, tables, and fields, whereby any party with proper
permissions can access one's personal information in real-time." Id.
352 See Smith Testimony, supra note 230.
353 See Molnar, supra note 47.
314 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see also discussion on the limitations of the
PATRIOT Act, supra Part IV.A.
355 See Molnar, supra note 47, at 35 ("domain name registrars worry about [the] cost and
time required to implement better verification procedures; commercial, business and non-
profit organizations fear a diminishing right to privacy .... )




tracking and data storage technologies cannot be utilized by other provid-
ers and Web hosts.35 7
As discussed above, U.S. law already requires ISPs to retain data for up
to ninety days upon government request. The Congress could follow the
European Union's lead and expand electronic data retention requirements
to one to two years. The aggressive data retention policy passed by the
European Parliament in late 2005 could provide a model for an interna-
tional standard for Internet data storage.5 8 Although the total amount of
data stored by ISPs would significantly increase, ICANN or other stake-
holders within the regulatory system could develop a common technology
that could be distributed to providers for a small fee. By providing a uni-
versally-applied technology, the type and character of data stored would be
very similar, regardless of the locality or size of the provider or host. Data
standardization would allow more efficient and productive investigations
by law enforcement around the world.
D. Establish a Centralized Monitoring and Enforcement Section at ICANN
to Track Illicit Internet Activities
In order to further substantiate its international regulatory and enforce-
ment legitimacy, ICANN could establish a centralized monitoring and en-
forcement division. This division could track online activities and identify
illicit operations and threat nodes that require immediate enforcement ac-
tion. While ICANN is empowered to take regulatory enforcement action
against providers and hosts, it has declined to take any measurable action
against non-compliant providers to date.359 This failure to act may be due
in part to the organization's lack of enforcement authority to actually track
online activities and identify compliance failures which require enforce-
ment actions.
Despite damage done to its legitimacy due to its failure to implement and
enforce its own regulations, ICANN is uniquely positioned to carry out
investigative and enforcement actions against illicit online actors. As the
357 id.
358 On December 14, 2005, the European Union passed the Internet Data Retention Di-
rective which requires that relevant Internet data must be retained for between six months
and two years, depending on the domestic laws of the member state. See Sara Dethridge,
Industry Has Doubts over Data Retention Directive: A Real Tool Against Terror?, COM-
PUTER WKLY., Mar. 14, 2006. The directive
requires companies to keep a wide range of data such as incoming and outgoing phone
numbers, the duration of phone calls, IP addresses that identify log-in and log-off
times and e-mail activity details ... will be made available to law enforcement agen-
cies for the investigation, detection, and prosecution of "serious crimes."
Id.
359 Molnar, supra note 47, at 32 (describing how ICANN has threatened to shut down
only one registrar for negligently failing to enforce Internet registration policies).
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primary guardian of the Internet's root servers, it has the ability to track
and shut down illicit providers, domains, and individual users. Much of
ICANN's core activity and duties in its early years has been focused on
establishing clearer lines of governing responsibility and maintaining the
site registration and accreditation system. As a result, the security dimen-
sion of ICANN's mission has suffered from neglect at a period in time
when cyber security continues to be a significant issue of concern.3 °
To launch an investigation and enforcement arm, ICANN could consult
with regional partnership organizations such as the G8's Lyon Group. 6
The multi-national G8 initiative is well-equipped to address these issues, as
it includes a European-based team of cyber investigators and an around-
the-clock response center to act on tips and emerging cyber threats.362
However, ICANN should eventually establish its own unit to exercise
similar capabilities over the entire Internet community in order to solidify
its long-term institutional legitimacy.
E. Naming and Shaming: Blacklisting the Perpetrators of Online Crimes
In conjunction with ICANN's efforts to establish preventive mechanisms
that make it more difficult for cyber jihadists and other criminals to exploit
the Internet, it is equally important that the organization create new en-
forcement mechanisms to raise the costs for cyber jihadists conducting
illegal business online, thereby deterring future illicit cyber activities.
One of the easiest and most cost-effective ways to punish and deter
wrongdoers is to name and shame individuals and organizations that are
banned from partaking in a particular activity. ICANN can implement this
strategy by creating a consolidated blacklist of individuals and entities
banned from using, benefiting, or profiting from the Internet. Publication
of a list of banned users, providers, and registrars would alert ICANN
stakeholders, the media, law enforcement officials, and the general public
to the named persona non grata on the Web. This concept is modeled on
the targeted terrorism sanctions regimes of the United Nations363 and the
United States, in which the assets of designated individuals are frozen and
the individuals or groups are publicly declared to be supporters of terror-
ism. 36 The U.S. has had substantial success in creating public sanction
360 See International, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Oct. 6, 2005; Business First, THE Aus-
TRALIAN, July 26, 2005; Question is Whether Attacks Will Strengthen or Hobble ICANN,
WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Sept. 24, 2001.
361 Hinnen, supra note 105, at 10.
362 Communiqu6, Ministerial Conference of the G-8 Countries on Combating Transna-
tional Organized Crime, Moscow, Russia, Oct. 19-20, 1999, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/i-crime/high-tec/conf9910.html.
363 S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 3.
364 Exec. Order No. 12,334, 31 C.F.R. § 591 (2000).
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lists of individuals and entities designated as terrorists, drug traffickers,
and proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.365
These sanctions lists also put banking institutions and American busi-
nesses on notice regarding the sanctioned targets, many of whom are major
financial and material sponsors of transnational terrorism and weapons
proliferation.366 As a result, these actors are effectively expelled from par-
ticipation in the legitimate commercial and financial sectors in the United
States and other industrialized countries.
To promote the efficacy of blacklists, ICANN must ensure the legitimacy
of the user ID system in order to empower providers to properly identify
blacklisted users.367 ICANN also must establish penalties for providers and
hosts who negligently provide services to blacklisted users lists, much the
same as the U.S. Government and the United Nations impose penalties on
banks that conduct business with designated targets.368
To establish the sanctions list as a legitimate and authoritative enforce-
ment mechanism, ICANN should bolster its existing audit and dispute
resolution sections to process and evaluate evidence against the targeted
users and providers. It must also develop a mechanism to hear and resolve
challenges to the ban of a particular user or provider. Again, establishing
an additional regulatory regime within ICANN will require broad stake-
holder support and a larger resource commitment from ICANN and its
financiers.
365 See id.; Exec. Order No. 13,382, 31 C.F.R. § 539 (1999); Exec. Order No. 12,978, 31
C.F.R. § 598 (2000). The U.S. targeted sanctions programs are operated by the U.S. De-
partment of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"). According to its Web
site the OFAC:
administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy
and national security goals against targeted foreign countries, terrorists, international
narcotics traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. OFAC acts under Presidential wartime and national
emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose con-
trols on transactions and freeze foreign assets under US jurisdiction.
OFAC, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcementlofac/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
366 Each time that the U.S. Department of Treasury announces an anti-terrorism, counter-
narcotics, or counter-proliferation designation, an electronic alert is distributed to banking
and financial institutions worldwide putting them on notice regarding the action. By law,
the institutions are then prohibited from conducting financial transactions with these indi-
viduals or entities. Violators of the regulations may face negative publicity and enforcement
actions including fines. See Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 50 (2003);
OFAC Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ustreas.gov/officeslenforcement/ofac/faq/
(last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
367 See supra Part VII.B.1.
368 Molnar, supra note 47, at 34-36 (describing the ineffectiveness of ICANN and its
sister organizations in monitoring and enforcing Internet regulations and an evaluation of
Congressional legislation which would impose fines on registrars and users who provide
false registration information).
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At the national level, Congress could emulate the public-private partner-
ship it mandated in the late 1990s to combat Internet child pornography
and online predators.369 In 1998, Congress passed legislation that required
Internet providers to report child pornography and child sexual exploitation
on the Internet to the NCMEC. 370 The legislation also mandated substantial
fines for providers who fail to report child pornography or child exploita-
tion on the Internet.37' In compliance with the statute, the NCMEC com-
piled and continuously updates a nationwide list identifying child pornog-
raphy Web sites and individual child predators.372 The NCMEC Web site
also provides a database of links to government and nongovernmental pro-
grams in other countries that track and enforce laws against child pornog-
raphy.
373
Congress could enact legislation to address terrorist-related activities on
the Internet modeled after the child pornography prevention and enforce-
ment regime. Such legislation should establish and fund a public-private
information and enforcement clearinghouse on terrorism-related materials
and content on the Internet in the model of the NCMEC. A National Center
for Terrorism and Violence-Related Activities on the Internet would create
a public face for the cyber terrorism issue and encourage industry and pri-
vate citizens to track and feed information to law enforcement officials on
terrorism activities while increasing the profile of this issue in the public
eye. Once established, the National Center could also launch a global part-
nership of country-level centers on cyber terrorism-related activities that
are interconnected to an international umbrella organization such as
ICANN.
F. Impose Negligence Fines for Providers Who Fail to Monitor and En-
force Content Restrictions
Another enforcement and deterrence mechanism needed to bolster the
overall Internet security environment are negligence fines. ICANN must
impose fines on providers and hosts who repeatedly fail to comply with the
monitoring requirements stipulated in the terms of standardized ICANN-
issued accreditation contracts. In addition to a credible threat of being pub-
369 42 U.S.C. § 13,032 (2000).
370 id.
171 Id. § 13,032(b)(4) (requiring fines for knowingly and willfully failing to make a re-
port to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children of not more than $50,000
for the first offense and not more than $100,000 for the second offense).
372 National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Cyber Tipline Factsheet,
http://www.missingkids.com/enUS/documents/CyberTiplineReportTotals.pdf (last visited
Oct. 30, 2006).
373 National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Global Network,
http://www.missingkids.com (select countries from the drop-down menu under "Global
Network" on the left tool bar) (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
2006]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
licly banned from the Internet, ICANN's ability to fine hosts and providers
would create a significant incentive for enhanced monitoring of online
content by the private sector.
In addition, ICANN regulators should examine the feasibility of includ-
ing language within the provider and host contracts that would impose a
negligence standard of tort liability upon providers for failure to comply
with the contract terms. While the legal application of these terms would
undoubtedly vary by individual country, the contractual language would
signal ICANN's intent to hold negligent providers accountable and rein-
force the legitimate authority relationship between ICANN and providers
and hosts.374 As such, ICANN would lead the effort to normalize Internet
legal and professional standards while providing incentives for the private
sector to increase monitoring and enforcement.375
G. Develop and Sustain Sufficient Funding and Technology Sources
In order for ICANN and its stakeholders to establish the organization as
the preeminent regulatory body charged with overseeing and protecting the
interests of the Internet, the organization's primary decision-makers must
create guaranteed, long-term sources of funding and technological re-
sources. As ICANN wrote in its 2004-2005 budget proposal:
[m]eeting the needs of registration providers and consumers is already a significant
element of ICANN's budget, but there are many activities that are under-funded and
under-staffed in light of the demand for such services. To provide the level of service
that appropriately fulfills ICANN's service goals will require substantial investments
in systems, infrastructure, regional presence and personnel.
376
Without the financial ability or technological know-how to hire and train
capable personnel who could develop technological tools to assist in bol-
stering the security of the Internet, ICANN will be incapable of capitaliz-
ing on the opportunity to reverse the lawless spiral of Internet regulatory
efforts and establish itself as the preeminent Internet governance organiza-
tion.
To accomplish these recommendations, along with other substantial
regulatory and administrative needs currently facing the Internet, ICANN
policymakers must identify long-term guaranteed funding streams.377 Sus-
374 See Nackley, supra note 256, at 10-17 (recommending specific boiler-plate Web site
hosting contractual language for distribution and use by providers and users).
375 See Johnson & Post, supra note 39, at 1387-91 (describing how the Internet commu-
nity will begin to develop legal norms to regulate online behavior as it becomes necessary).
376 ICANN, PROPOSED FISCAL YEAR 2004-2005 BUDGET 11 (2004) [hereinafter 2004-
2005 ICANN BUDGET], available at http://www.icann.org/financials/proposed-budget-
14mayO4.pdf.
37 Id. at 17. The ICANN budget proposal emphasizes the need to "develop alternate
sources of funding in order to provide a more robust revenue base" by securing a more
consistent base of funding from ICANN stakeholders. Id.
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tainable and reliable funding of ICANN continues to be a problem for the
organization.378 A possible solution is the imposition of fees on providers
and Web hosts, to be collected on regular intervals.3 79 While many industry
representatives have opposed the imposition of additional user access fees
because of the small size and profitability of some providers, 380 the reality
is that the administrative and security challenges facing the Internet require
a greater resource commitment from those who benefit the most from
maintaining access to the Internet. ICANN has indicated that it is consider-
ing such fees as a way to address its funding challenges.
Under "Alternate Sources of Revenue," the ICANN 2004-2005 budget
proposal claimed that ICANN "could derive fees from the revenue stream
flowing to registries as a result of new registry services., 38 ' In addition, in
2004-2005, ICANN sought to bolster its revenue by billing fees charged to
registrants through registrars on a per transaction basis versus the previous
quarterly basis billing cycle.382 In early 2006, ICANN issued a new frame-
work for collecting adequate "user fees" from registrars and Top Level
Domain ("ccTLD") organizations.383 In its document, "Guidelines for
ccTLD Managers Accountability Framework Discussions with ICANN, ' 8
ICANN states that it is "working . . . to ascertain a) an agreed amount
within the total ICANN Budget that could be paid by ccTLD managers and
b) a model by which to fairly apportion that amount between ccTLD man-
agers." However, any contribution made by the ccTLDs will remain volun-
tary until ICANN and the Country Code Names Supporting Organization,
the parent organization for TLDs, can reach a consensus agreement on
regular annual fees for TLDs to make to ICANN.385
378 id.
379 Klein, supra note 305, at 196.
380 Register.com Joins Industry Call for Changes to ICANN.com Proposals, Bus. WIRE,
Feb. 15, 2006; Contracting the Internet: Does ICANN Create a Barrier to Small Business?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (June 7, 2006)(statement of
Mr. W.G. Champion Mitchell, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Network Solutions,
LLC).
381 2004-2005 ICANN BUDGET, supra note 376, at 17.
382 Id. at 14.
383 ICANN, GUIDELINES FOR ccTLD MANAGERS AccouNTABILITy FRAMEWORK DIscus-
SIONS wlT ICANN, http://ccnso.icann.org/announcements/af-guidelines-14decO5.pdf (last
visited Aug. 24, 2006).
384 Id.
385 See ICANN, ICANN MANAGERS ACCOUNTABILrrY FRAMEWORK 3 (2005). The
ICANN Accountability Managers framework established a vaguely defined preliminary fee
agreement that ccTLDs:
[s]hall contribute to ICANN's cost of operations in the amount of [ ] per annum. It is
acknowledged by both parties that the ccTLD community and ICANN are working to-
gether to obtain a formula to determine permanent and satisfactory contribution to
ICANN. If there is no agreement on a permanent solution for ccTLD contributions to
ICANN the parties agree to review in good faith ... the contribution to ICANN set out
above.... The review of the parties will take into account all relevant circumstances.
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Another source of ICANN funding could be derived from assessing a
reasonable fee on for-profit Web site merchants who earn a certain amount
of revenue-perhaps over $100 million per year-from their Web site
sales. ICANN appears to be evaluating similar proposals for assessing
commercial user fees.38 6 In its 2004-2005 budget, ICANN described the
"substantial opportunity for commercial organizations that benefit directly




Despite the fact that senior national security officials and Internet policy
experts have been aware since the mid-1990s that terrorist groups were
targeting the Internet as an operational and communications platform, far
too little has been done to cut off the Internet from terrorist elements. Al
Qaeda and affiliated terrorist movements continue to exploit the Internet as
an operational platform for the indoctrination, recruitment, fundraising,
training, and more recently, planning and coordination of terrorist at-
tacks.388 Cyber jihadists' unrestricted online activities continue to lead to
the killing and maiming of thousands of innocent civilians worldwide each
year. Domestic and international policies toward cyber jihadists' online
activities that focus on deterrence and passive enforcement of content regu-
lations are no longer tenable. Cyber jihadists pose an increasingly intoler-
able national security risk to the United States and its allies due to the so-
phisticated online planning and operational activities of potential attacks
weapons of mass destruction and suicide terrorist attacks.
The time to act is now. Yet, the U.S. government, foreign governments,
ICANN and other private stakeholders continue to fail to implement sig-
nificant prevention and enforcement-oriented reforms that will make it
more difficult for terrorists to exploit the Internet. 389 By establishing an
aggressive timetable for Internet security reform while evaluating and im-
plementing the seven core regulatory and enforcement tools proposed in
this Comment for combating the cyber jihad threat, ICANN, sovereign
governments, and private stakeholders can begin to stem the tide of terror-
ist exploitation of the Internet.
Id.
386 2004-2005 ICANN BUDGET, supra note 376, at 17-18.
387 Id.
388 See discussion supra Part IH.C.
389 See discussion supra Part IV-V.
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